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F O R E W O R D 
This study is the most comprehensive evaluation of the Integrated 
Rural Development Programme of Pakistan since its inception in 1972. 
The government had assigned a critical role to this programme in its 
overall rural development policy. As an objective assessment of the 
programme, the present study should be of immense interest to the policy-
makers in Pakistan. The study should, however, attract a wider audience. 
The authors have evolved and applied a method of evaluation that can 
also be applied to other government programmes in Pakistan and other 
countries. 
The methodology adopted in the study is simple but useful in identify-
ing the strengths and weaknesses of the programme in actual operation. 
Three steps in the evaluation technique need to be highlighted. First, the 
assumptions and objectives of the programme are analysed in detail. 
Criteria, both quantitative and qualitative, against which the working of 
the programme is evaluated are formulated. Second, primary data from 
selected Markazes are collected to assess the degree to which the prcgran me 
objectives were realized. Finally, the effects of the programme on broader 
social goals such as people's participation, streamlining of delivery of public 
services to rural areas and increasing agricultural productivity are examined, 
The findings of the study are many. These are competently sum-
marized by the authors in the concluding chapter. Three general points 
need some emphasis, however. First, there is a widespread demand from 
rural communities for increased supplies of inputs and public services. 
Second, there is a need for co-ordination among government departments 
serving the rural community and availability of adequate resources for 
funding the increased supplies of inputs and public services. Third, lack 
of co-ordination among government departments and various public groups 
and shortage of resources inevitably leads to corruption and inequitable 
distribution of the benefits from the programme. The authors have found 
some evidence of these tendencies in the implementation of the programme. 
The policy implications of the analysis are many. The programme 
needs increased funding and a general government support. There is a 
need for greater local level planning and for providing safeguards to assure 
the flow of benefits for the poorer segments of the rural population. 
Keeping in view the limitations of data, the authors have done a com-
mendable job. The study is a valuable addition to the literature on rural 
development in Pakistan. 
M . L . QURESHI 
Director 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics 
Islamabad 
(iii) 
P R E F A C E 
For countries like Pakistan, national development is synonymous 
with improvements in rural living conditions and modernization of rural 
production systems. Rural development has come to be regarded as an 
essential element of national development strategies in the third world. 
At any point in time one or other rural development programme is 
sweeping the developing countries often under considerable promotional 
efforts of international agencies and aid donors. In the early sixties, 
community development and self-help programmes were the favoured 
solutions of rural poverty. By the late sixties, rural works programmes 
were inspiring hopes of rural uplift. Presently, the Integrated Rural 
Development Programme has become the centrepiece of rural development 
strategies. Each programme is initially hailed as a 'break-through* 
in rural development and is greeted with optimism. On implementation, 
the optimism begins to fizzle out, though protestations about relevance of 
a programme continue. The demise of a programme is usually signalled 
by the talk of a new one. Pakistan's programmes of "V-AID, Rural 
Works and agricultural development have successively followed, more 
or less, the same pattern. 
It is not the rhythm of the rise and fall of individual programmes that 
is disconcerting. Rather, the relative insensitivity of a latter programme 
to experiences of an earlier one is the source of disappointment. It causes 
much waste of efforts through the repetition of mistakes and leads to the 
loss of public credibility about rural development. There are complex 
institutional and political reasons for the persistence of this pattern through 
a succession of programmes. From a planning point of view, one of the 
most obvious reasons is lack of systematic evaluations of these programmes. 
Not many of the bygone rural development programmes were adequately 
evaluated and there were few, if any, feed back mechanisms to monitor 
their outcomes. In view of this experience, it is imperative that the 
Integrated Rural Development Programme may be continually evaluated, 
so that appropriate measures could be taken to maintain the momentum 
of the programme. This study is an attempt to evaluate the programme. 
This study is a concurrent evaluation of the Integrated Rural 
Development Programme in two provinces of Pakistan. Its basic aim 
is to assess the effectiveness of the Markaz concept as an instrument of 
the programme. After identifying significant programme objectives, 
the study proceeds to assess the degree to which these objectives are being 
realized. It also examines effects of the realization of objectives on 
broader social goals such as raising agricultural production, increasing 
people's participation and facilitating the delivery of public services to 
rural areas. 
The study is based on a thorough examination of programme assump-
tions and objectives. It draws upon provincial programme data from. 
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Punjab and the N.W.F.P. This information is complemented by in depth 
field studies of Markazes in each of the two provinces. The study was, 
essentially, completed in summer 1976. There are a number of metho-
dological assumptions and procedures which underlie this study. Those 
have been discussed in Appendix-D. The findings of this study deserve 
to be taken into account by policy makers. It can be said that they are 
based on limited data from two Markazes, and therefore are not generaliz-
able to the whole programme. Yet they point out such tendencies which 
if found pervasive should prompt a thorough re-examination of the 
premises and operations of the programme. This study has been sponsored 
by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. I worked as a short-
term consultant in the Institute. Although this study constitutes a part 
of the Institute's on-going work on developmental issues, the opinions 
expressed herein are my responsibility. I am very grateful to have had 
this opportunity. There are a number of agencies and individuals who 
have contributed to the success of this project. I can only briefly mention 
some. 
The encouragement and advice of Mr. M. L. Qureshi, the Director 
of the Institute, sustained this study through all the phases. I am very 
grateful for all his efforts. Many colleagues at the Institute helped resolve 
methodological and conceptual issues and facilitated my task intellec-
tually as well as emotionally. Dr. Sarfraz K. Qureshi must be singled out 
for the support and help. Without the assistance of Mr. Iftikharullah 
Babar and Mohammad Rashid, the study would perhaps not have come 
to. fruition. I am also indebted to the Advisory Research Committee of 
the Queen's University, Kingston, Canada and to the School of Urban 
and Regional Planning for the travel grant which enabled me to spend 
three months in Pakistan. 
Officials of the federal and provincial ministries of rural development 
were very co-operative. The directors of integrated Rural Development 
Programmes in Punjab and the N.W.F.P. generously extended help in 
data collection. The Staff at Battal and Manawala Markazes not only 
patiently put up with long interviews but also helped in the field work. 
Their hospitality was heart warming. Twelve weeks of separation from 
my family was a hardship for all of us which my wife and children bore 
for my sake. Friends in Islamabad made my stay pleasant and comfor-
table. To all of them I owe gratitude. 
All of us had sort of vested interests in this study. Only the people 
of Battal and Manawala areas had no perceivable benefits from such an 
undertaking. Yet they opened their hearts and homes to us. By sub-
mitting to our long interviews and by treating us as house guests, they 
reaffirmed human warmth and concern. To them this study is dedicated. 








List of Tables (vii) 
C H A P T E R 
I. THE CONCEPTUAL BASES OF THE INTEGRATED 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME I 
(a) Rural Development in Pakistan 1 
(b) The Integrated Rural Development Programme: 
Concept and Approach 2 
(c) The IRDP in Pakistan 4 
(d) Objectives of Pakistan's IRDP 5 
(e) Markaz Concept and Programme 7 
( f ) Programme Evaluation: Methodological Issues 10 
(g) Scope and Method of Study 11 
II. INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PUNJAB 15 
(a) Introduction 15 
(b) The Programme in Operation 16 
(c) Supply of Agricultural Inputs 17 
(d) Co-operative Societies 18 
(e) Physical Infrastructure 19 
( f ) Co-ordination of Public Services 20 
Case Study of Manawala Markaz 22 
Summary of Findings 38 (vi i) 
UI. INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE Page 
N.W.F.P. 40 
(a) The Scope of the IRDP 40 
(b) Budgetary Allocations 42 
(c) Markaz Co-operative Societies in the N.W.F.P. 43 
(d) Co-ordination of Public Services 44 
Case Study of Battal Markaz 46 
Summary of Findings 60 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 63 
(a) The IRDP and Agricultural Development 65 
(b) Farm Planning and Incomes, Non-Agricultural 
Job Opportunities 68 
(c) Infrastructural Development and improving 
Living Conditions 68 
(d) People's Participation and Local Leadership 71 
References 72 
.APPENDIX 74 
A. Objectives of the IRDP, Punjab 74 
B. List of Markazes in Punjab and Their Population 76 
C. Objectives of the IRDP in North West Frontier 
Province 85 
D. Research Methodology 92 
E. Interview Schedule, Manawala 95 
F. Interview Schedule, Battal 95 
(viii) 
List of Tables 
Table 
No. Title Page 
2.1 Budgetary Allocations in Punjab 16 
2.2 Co-operative Societies Organized Under the IRDP 18 
2.3 Selected Indices of Physical Development 19 
2.4 Postings of Departmental Representatives 21 
2.5 Shopping Places 24 
2.6 Improvement in Availability of Goods and Services 25 
2.7 Reasons for Change in the Availability of Services 26 
2.8 Change in Wheat Production 28 
2.9 Reasons for Change in Wheat Production 28 
2.10 Co-operative Societies in Manawala 29 
2.11 Knowledge of Co-operative Society 30 
2.12 Acquaintance of Markaz Officials 31 
2.13 Role of Co-operative Society Members 32 
2.14 Influence of Model Farmer 33 
2.15 Beneficiaries of the Markaz Projects 35 
2.16 Reasons for Changes in Living Conditions of the Poor 36 
2.17 Educational Attainments of Farmers Participating in the 
Precision Land Levelling Demonstration Project 37 
3.1 Proposed Expenditure per Markaz Over a Five Years Period 41 
3.2 Expenditure on Markazes 42 
3.3 Budgetary Allocations and Expenditures 42 
3.4 Co-operative Organizations in the N.W.F.P.. .. .43 
( ix) 
Page 
3.5 Works Programme 1975^976 44 
3.6 \ Posting of Departmental Representatives at Markazes, 1975 45 
317 Shopping Places 48 
318 Improvements in Availability of Goods and Services 50 
3.9 Changes in the Yield of Maize 51 
3; 10 Co-operative Societies in Battal 52 
3,11 Decisions of Co-operative Society 53 
3<12 Knowledge about Leader's Training 54 
3>13 Leader's Role in Disseminating Information 55 
3.14 Change in Leadership Patterns 56 
3.15 Budget Allocations, Battal 56 
3; 16 Facilities Built by Markaz 57 
3.17 Beneficiaries of the IRDP 58 
3.18 Living Conditions of the Poor 59 
3.19 Occupations of Presidents and Managers of Co-operative 
Societies. 60 
4.1 Summary of Findings from Case Studies 66 
Appendix Table 
B.l Distribution of Agricultural Inputs in Punjab 77 
B.2 IRDP Agricultural Services in Punjab 78 
B,3 Performance of Co-operative Societies in Punjab 79 
B.4 Representatives of Nation Building'.Departments 80 
B.5 Informant's Occupation 81 
B.6 Informant's Status 81 
0 0 
Page 
B.7 Shift Towards Manawala 82 
B.8 Information about Village Society Members 82 
B.9 Awareness of IRDP 83 
B.10 Needs of the Village 83 
B.ll Change in Living Conditions of Poor 84 
C.l Works Expenditures in the N.W.F.P. 87 
C.2 Informant's Occupation 88 
C.3 Informant's Status 8 8 
C.4 Shift Towards Battal 89 
C.5 Meetings of Village Societies 89 
C.6 Accomplishment of Co-operative Societies 90 
C.7 Information about IRDP Officials 90 
C.8 Needs of Village 91 
C.9 Status of Society Office Bearers 91 
(x i ) 
Chapter 1 
THE CONCEPTUAL BASES OF THE INTEGRATED RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
(a) Rural Development in Pakistan 
Rural poverty and stagnation are the most intractable problems con-
fronting the third world. An overwhelming majority of the people in the 
third world lives in rural areas eking out subsistence living from traditional 
agricultural systems. Without radical changes in rural economies and 
social structures, these countries will not be able to fulfill their ambitions 
to be prosperous and modern nations. The challenge of development 
lies in rural areas. This fact has been discovered only recently by the 
international community [World Bank, 1975]. 
Pakistan is a predominantly rural country. According to the 1972 
census, about 74 percent of Pakistan's population was living in rural areas. 
Pakistan's economic development depends upon her success in improving 
rural living conditions and increasing agricultural production. This reali-
zation has remained, more or less at the forefront of national conscious-
ness, though there have been temporary relapses from this realization. 
From Dehat Sudhar to Village Agricultural and Industrial development, 
popularly Known as V-AID, a series of public programmes bear testimony 
to the national desire, if not commitment, to uplift the rural sector. Gene-
rally, these programmes have been disappointing. This does not suggest 
that rural areas have remained untouched by modern institutions and tech-
nology or they have not experienced any change. Over the past two de-
cades, they have acquired new technologies and activities, shed off many 
old customs and beliefs and imbibed political consciousness. In talking 
about the disappointment of the rural development programmes, we are 
referring to failures encountered in quickening the pace of development 
through public programmes. What are the reasons for these failures? 
Answering this question will take us far afield from our present interest. 
There are few systematic studies of the past efforts to provide definitive 
answers. Some impressionistic accounts are available in official publi-
cations.1 
Presently, our primary interest lies in the current efforts of rural deve-
lopment popularly known as the Integrated Rural Development Pro-
gramme. This study is an attempt to determine the effectiveness of this 
' F o l l o w i n g are some commonly ment ioned reasons for the failure of past rural 
development programmes in Pakistan: 
(a) Lack of co-ordinat ion amo ng government departments. 
Cb) Single purpose programmes, (c) Untrained staff. 
(id) < ailure to develop grass root leadership. (e) D o m i n a t i o n by i n f l u e n t i a l and 
U ) Lack of supervision, research and evaluat ion public officials. 
(Government of Pakistan, Ministry of F o o d , Agriculture and Under D e v e -
loped Areas) Integrated Rural Development Programme—a revolutionary approach 
March 1973. p.3. 
programme. It is an attempt to find out whether the expectations 
associated with the current programme are likely to be fulfilled. 
(b) The Integrated Rural Development Programme: Concept and Approach 
The Integrated Rural Development Programme (to be referred as 
IRDP here on) is being acclaimed as a revolutionary approach. The United 
Nations Organization has become a strong protagonist of the IRDP and 
its member organizations have been active in promoting such programmes 
in the third world [United Nations, 1971]. Even if some allowance is 
given for the usual enthusiasm that the promoters of a new international 
concepts (and programmes) initially imbibe, there still remains some basis 
for regarding this programme differently from the earlier ones. It has some 
innovative features derived from the lessons of the earlier rural develop-
ment efforts. 
Programmes of rural development can be categorized into three types. 
First, there are the rural social reconstruction efforts with emphasis on 
social reforms and popular education. Such programmes are based on the 
assumption that rural backwardness is attributable to rigid social organi-
zation, traditional values and general unawareness. The second types 
of programmes are essentially agricultural extension efforts which presume 
that ignorance about modern agricultural practices is the basic cause 
of low production and consequently, rural poverty. The third set of 
programmes postulates that the development of physical and social 
infrastructures in rural areas is a pre-requisite for the modernization of 
rural areas. Of course, there have seldom been any programmes purely 
of one type. In practice, a certain degree of hybridity of programme 
is the rule. Yet the primary focus of the earlier rural development pro-
grammes have bee 1 on one or the other types mentioned above. By and 
large, those, were single purpose, unisectoral programmes. The Integrated 
Rural Development Approach takes a comprehensive and systematic view 
of rural life, i 
Proceeding from a thorough understanding of the needs and problems 
of a rural area, this approach calls for simultaneous and concentrated 
efforts to develop the strategic sectors. Synchronizing in time and space 
of various sectoral programmes does not constitute an integrated approach. 
A programme qualifies to be called integrated if it has an interlinked and 
com ilementary set of activities whose combined effect constitutes a critical 
mass to jolt out a rural system from a low level equilibrium. Undoubtedly, 
few programmes, fashionably labelled as IRDP, meet this criterion. Be 
as it may, the IRDP is not an administrative concept; rather it is an analy-
tical approach based on a systematic view of rural life. A few other ele-
ments have come to be associated with the concept of IRDP. To be mea-
ningful, a programme of rural development must promote the welfare of 
the majority of the rural population which happens to be poor. Unless 
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programmes are specifically designed to serve interests of the poor, they 
are not likely to bring about a quantum change in rural living conditions. 
This realization has emerged after uncertain results of twenty years 
of development planning. The World Bank has gone so far as to define 
rural development to be a strategy designed to improve the economic and 
social life of a specific group of people—the rural poor [World Bank 
1975, p. 3]. In the same vein, it has been realized that peoples participation 
in the decision making process for the development of an area is a neces-
sary condition for the success of a programme. This realization has intro-
duced the dimension of public participation in the concept of IRDP. 
The IRDP is the latest addition to the catalogue of rural development 
programme. Its recentness is not a guarantee of its perfection. Undoub-
tedly, it incorporates experiences gained from the community develop-
ment, the rural works and other similar programmes. These lessons consti-
tute the empirical underpinning of the programme. The systematic out-
look, comprehensive and multisectoral approach, specification of the target 
population, emphasis on people's participation and local leadership, spatial 
focus and priority given to the theoretically well grounded concepts. They 
lend credibility to the IRDP. Yet the programme is not free from con-
ceptual inconsistencies. 
The integrated rural development approach combines disparate postu-
lates. Some are programmatic rules of thumb and others are abstract 
goals).2 Its theoretical inconsistencies would have been a minor, fault 
(of concern to theoreticians only) if they had not been accompanied by 
operational confusion. There is a sense of abandon in the use of the term 
Integrated Rural Development. 
Almost, every variety of rural programme is being proffered under 
the rubric of the IRDP, as can be observed from Lale's account [Lale 1975: 
2For example the fo l lowing list of e lements o f the I R D P illustrates h o w specific 
means (items iii, vi, vii) are mixed with all embracing ends and plat i tudinous goals 
( items /, ii, iv, v etc.) 
1 R D P consists o f : 
( i ) A comprehensive approach responding to the problems of rural poverty and 
dualism ; . • 
0 0 a set of goals based on rational analysis o f needs and including social and 
economic bases o f well being and progress ; 
(III) a pre-requisite agrarian reorganizat ion, if necessary, that provides land tenure 
and land institutional framework suitable for labour intensive agriculture; 
(»v) rural action through area projects including proper mix of activities for each 
local area ; 
(v) regional approaches in defining project areas and making long term plans ; 
(vi) emphasis on building popular inst itutions, and especially co-operat ives; 
(vii) administrative arrangements that foster g o o d local government and popular 
participation. 
Lawrence B. Moore. " The concept o f integrated rural deve lopment—An international 
view " Government of Pakistan, U N D P and F A O : The International Seminar o n 
Integrated Rural Development. Lahore N o v e m b e r 3—10, 1973, p. 7. 
pp.11]. These conceptual and operational ambiguities have prompted re 
labelling of many existing programmes. Rutton describes these concep-
tual limitations in an apt line : IRDP "is an ideology in search of a me-
thodology or technology" [Rutton 1975, p. 4]. 
The IRDP has been inspired by the systems approach. It professes 
to view a rural area as a socio-economic system and attempts to identify 
strategic elements around which appropriate programme might be for-
mulated. This is a sound principle but it has seldom been followed. 
There are methodological difficulties of this approach that tax the patience 
of action oriented promotors of the IRDP. There is a wide gap between 
its Philosophy and practice. Almost very description of the IRDP dwells 
on its philosophy and has little to offer by way of operational measures. 
Many a times the [RDP means little more than a catalogue of sectoral pro-
grammes. A programme designed as a whole with the appreciation of 
sectoral linkages is a rarity. 
At the plane of broader goals of rural development, some other limi-
tations of the IRDP are revealed. Ultimately, the success of a rural deve-
lopment programme lies in generating a dynamic, prosperous and just 
rural satiety. Inequitable power structures and traditional economic 
organizations are the primary obstacles militating against the realization 
of these goals. To remove these obstacles, bold political and social mea-
sures are needed. The IRDP is essentially technocratic in spirit and ap-
proach. It is a gradualist's conception of rural development to be pro-
moted through reformed existing institutions. Almost a quarter century 
of experience in promoting rural development indicates that incremental 
changes are appropriated by the traditionally powerful for their personal 
advantage and class benefit. The critical mass effect that the IRDP asoires 
to precipitate is seldom obtained through increased and concentrated in-
puts in conventional sectors. The IRDP needs a political strategy as much 
as a bureaucratic mechanism. And the former is precluded by the fact 
that the [ROP is conceived within the confines of the traditional roles of 
technocrats. 
The conceptual and methodological limitations of the IRDP revealed 
by this critique remain a matter of intellectual quibbling as long as one is 
discussing the concept in abstract. An examination of a specific programme 
is necessary to determine the validity and relevance of the points raised 
above. Therefore, we turn OUP attention to the IRDP in Pakistan. 
(c) The IRDP in Pakistan 
The IRDP was formally launched in July 1972. In philosophy and 
timing it bears close resemblance to similar programme of other third world 
countries. Two types of influences seem to have shaped Pakistan's 
IRDP. 
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The primary influences are indigenous. Lessons of the V-AID and 
Rural Work Programmes underscored the desirability of a multi-sectoral 
and comprehensive approach. Shadab project has demonstrated that 
agricultural production can be raised by concentrated and co-ordina-
ted application of fertilizer, seed, credit and advice. Comilla experiment 
followed by Daudzai pilot project have affirmed the viability of local groups 
planning and executing developmental decisions with the advice and sup-
port of public functionaries. The IRDP has rationalized these ideas and 
established an institutional framework for their implementation. 
Pakistan's experiences have been reaffirmed by events in other coun-
tries. In early 70's there was a virtual explosion of ideas prompted by 
failures of the previous rural development programmes [Fisher 1975, 
pp 36-37]. These ideas converged into the then, new approach of Inte-
grated rural Development. This international reaffirmation of Pakistan's 
thinking about evolving an integrated approach to rural development gave 
further impetus to the programme. An International Seminar on Integrated 
Rural Development jointly organized by the Government of Pakistan, 
F.A.O. andU.N.D.P. in November 1973 brought these two strands together. 
Pakistan has devised a unique strategy to implement IRDP. Markaz 
is the key feature of this strategy. We will discuss the concept of Markaz, 
later; presently we shall analyze the objectives of the programme. 
(d) Objectives of Pakistan's IRDP 
There is a remarkable unanimity of views about the goals of rural 
development. Increasing agricultural production, diversifying the village 
economy, creating employment opportunities, improving rural living condi-
tions and ensuring an egalitarian social structure appear on almost every 
list of rural development goals. Pakistan's programme have also been 
drawn with the same ends in view. 
In looking for an authoritative statement of the IRDP objectives, one 
finds slightly differing versions in various publications. The objectives 
of N.W.F.P's programme are differently articulated and ordered than 
the goals attributed to Punjab's efforts. The federal government position 
is, perhaps, reflected in various papers prepared by officials of the Ministry 
of Rural Development.3 This search for a definitive statement of objec-
tives is not a mere ideal curiousity. It was meant to provide criteria to 
evaluate the programme. 
sThere are some variations even in the statements o f federal officials; for example, 
compare Sadiq Malik " Genes i s o f Rural Deve lopment in Pakistan". Integrated 
Rural Development Review. December 1975, Vol . 1 ; Government of Pakistan, 
Ministry of F o o d , Agriculture and Rural D e v e l o p m e n t p . 8. and Sadiq Malik 
" Integrated Rural Deve lopment Programme in Pakis tan". Report o f the Inter-
national Seminar on Integrated Rural Development. Government of Pakistan, Ministry 
of F o o d , Agriculture and Rural Deve lopment . N o v e m b e r 1973, p. 191. 
Although a uniform statement of objectives could not be found, a set 
of common objectives could be abstracted from various accounts. These 
objectives have been divided in two categories; namely, (i) Ultimate and 
(ii) Instrumental. The former are assumed to be the end states towards 
which rural areas should be directed, whereas the latter are considered to 
be the operational goals whose realization will lead towards those end 
states. For evaluating the programme the instrumental objectives are more 
useful, because they can be turned into evaluational criteria. Chart I 
presents the two types of programme objectives. 
Chart I 
Objectives of the IRDP 
Ultimate* 
(A) Increasing economic 
growth and food production. 
Instrumental 
Al. Introduction of modern agri-
cultural methods among small 
and medium farmers. 
A2. Credit, banking,transportation, 
marketing, storage facilities for 
small farmers. 
A3. Provision of farm planning and 
management services. 
(B) Attaining satisfactory 
level of living. 
Bl. Provision of service infrastruc-
ture to deliver social and eco-
nomic inputs. 
(C) Reduction of migration 
from rural to urban area. 
(D) Creation of viable local 
institutions and group 
dynamics. 
B2. Improvement of basic physical 
and social infrastructure. 
CI. Creation of labour intensive 
off-farm job opportunity. 
C2. Spreading urban amenities into 
countryside. 
Dl . Popular participation in rural 
development. 
D2. Encouragement of local leader-
ship. 
D3. Provision for co-operative 
farming. 
Deduced from Sadiq Mal ik : " G e n e s i s o f Rural D e v e l o p m e n t in Pakis tan", ibid p. 8. 
• U l t i m a t e object ives might a lso be called national goals , whereas instrumental 
objectives may be equated with the programme purposes or outputs . 
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The emphasis on economic production is evident from the commit-
ment to raise agricultural output and to diversify employment opportuni* 
ties. The significance given to social development is reflected by instru" 
mental objectives promising development of community infrastructure* 
spreading of urban amenities and mobilization of collective action. The 
decision making process has been given a place of prominence through the 
normative requirements of encouraging participatory decision making pro-
cesses. By specifying medium and small farmers as the target group the 
programme also establishes an imrlicit welfare criterion. How these ob-
jectives have been incorporated in the concept of Markaz which is the main 
vehicle to implement the IRDP, we shall, now, explore. 
(e) Markaz Concept and Programme 
Markaz is a geographical as well as an organizational concept. Geo-
graphically, it is a designated area (sub-region) extending over the terri-
tory commanded by 50 to 60 villages which is subjected to intensive public 
and private developmental efforts. Designation of an area as a Markaz 
makes it an organizational and administrative unit of the programme and 
makes it eligible for IRDP allocations.4 
Administratively a Markaz is a field unit of the IRDP establishment. 
A village or small town is chosen as the centre of the Markaz area. The 
Markaz centre is envisaged to provide a spatial focus for the area and is 
meant to perform an integrative role by bringing together not only the offi-
cials of the rural development department but also functionaries of other 
nation-building departments literally under one roof in a building called a 
Markaz complex. The Markaz centre has a key role in the development 
of a Markaz area. It is meant to be a growth point which through com-
mercial and industrial development would become a service town (Agro-
ville) for the Markaz area. Incidently, by now the dual referent of the 
term Markaz would have been obvious. It is used to refer to a Markaz 
area as well as to its central place (Markaz Centre). 
A Markaz has a two-tiered organizational structure, both in adminis-
trative and local government terms. A Markaz is envisaged to become a 
unit of local government, but in the absence of elected local councils, the 
IRDP has promoted multipurpose village co-operative societies, to insti-
tutionalize people's involvement in development decisions. These socie-
ties constitute the base of local institutions and the Markaz Council forms 
-•The official definition o f the Markaz concept is given in the fo l lowing quotat ion. 
" T o select a production area compris ing 50 to 60 vil lages most ly with small and 
medium size farmers with a view o f improving their soc io -economic status by 
intensive rural development programme with an initial thrust to increase productivity 
by providing technical guidance , supervised credit , supply o f inputs , machinery o n 
hire, storage and marketing facil it ies etc. , based on sound physical, organizational and 
institutional infrastructure, by intensification and commercial izat ion of agriculture 
through a social co-operative system under total approach". Government of Pakistan: 
Pakistan's Concept. 1973. 
the second tier. The organization of the Integrated Rural Development 
Department is similarly drawn. A project Manager is the executive head 
of the IRDP in the Markaz area. His staff includes co-operative, engi-
neering and agriculture specialists. They help a project manager to or-
ganize and advise village co-operative societies and to perform various 
technical functions. The lower tier of Markaz functionaries is formed by 
development assistants in Punjab, Secretaries of Dehi committee in Sind 
and Dehi karkun in Baluchistan. 
It is, also, evident from this description that the organization of the 
IRDP varies from province to province. The IRDP lays great emphasis 
on concentration of public services and know-how in Markaz areas. In 
this task, it relies on the nation-building departments to provide the neces-
sary services and guidance. A project manager acts as a co-ordinator of 
their activities. 
From various descriptions of Markaz, a set of basic elements of the 
Markaz concept can be abstracted.5 These elements can be assumed to 
constitute the core of Markaz as an operational programme. Following 
are brief descriptions of these elements: 
(a) Centrality: It is a basic constituent of the Markaz concept. By 
concentrating public offices and commercial establishments at the 
centre, Markaz helps integrate these functions. The centre is meant 
to provide an urban focus for the Markaz area and act as a 
growth point to spread modern technology, institutions and 
practices. 
(b) Integration of Public and Private Services: By designating the 
Markaz as a unit of development administration, the delivery of 
public services is channelled through it. By inducing public 
(and private) bodies to post their representatives at a Markaz 
and by assigning co-ordinative functions to the project manager, 
the programme hopes to bring about the desired integration of 
services. 
(c) Simultaneous Delivery of Agricultural Inputs: Given a predominant 
role of agriculture in rural economy, special emphasis has been 
laid on increasing the agricultural output and incomes. The 
Markaz concept incorporates the notion of simultaneous and 
concentrated application of inputs such as credit, seed, fertilizer, 
insecticide, advice, storage and marketing, etc. 
(d) Organization and Mobilization of People: The Markaz specifi-
cally prescribes a participatory decision making process. This 
sThese e lements have been deduced from the object ives o f Markaz in N W F P and 
Punjab. See N W F P Department Local Government PCI. Rural Development in 
NWFP 1975-1980 January 1975 and Directorate o f Integrated Rural Deve lopment 
Review of Progress 1972-75 Lahore, Punjab. 
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element has been institutionalized in the two-tired structure of 
co-operative societies. 
(e) Stimulation of Social Awareness and Training of Local Leaders: 
This element is incorporated in the institution of extension and 
adult education and is institutionized in the local leaders' training 
programme. 
(f) Improving Living Conditions: The Markaz concept recognizes 
the significance of better health, education and communication 
facilities. By laying emphasis on physical infrastructure develop-
ment, Markaz provides a framework for this element of the con-
cept. 
(g) Specified Target Population: The Markaz concept specifically aims 
to improve the socio-economic status of the medium and small 
farmers. The markaz concept combines strands of various theo-
retical and programmatic approaches, e.g., rural development ap-
proach, notions of growth point and postulates of regional planning 
particularly the strategy of promoting central places as regional 
foci, and philosophy of community development. Its eclecticism is 
both a strength and a weakness. The strength lies in its multi-
sectoral and comprehensive outlooks which have been trans-
lated into sophisticated operational measures. On the other 
hand, there is a lack of focus and coherence in the concept which 
is likely to generate contradictions in the implementation of the 
programme.6 
The Markaz concept discussed above has been operationalized diffe-
rently by the four provinces. Each province adopted the concept to suit 
its institutional and physical conditions. Punjab's Markaz concept has been 
derived from Shadab pilot project. It lays emphasis on concentrating and 
co-ordinating agricultural extension services at Markaz Centre and promot-
ing their use through pursuasion and increased supply. The N.W.F.P. 
has adopted Daudzai model as the basis of her Markaz programme. 
Daudzai pilot project evolved a people-oriented approach in which public 
functionaries act as organizers, advisors and trainers of local leadership 
and the village co-operative associations assume planning and implemen-
tation functions. Daudzai model allows building of roads, irrigation 
channels and other public works through local initiative and includes pro-
vision of public funds for such projects We will be discussing these models 
extensively in respective case studies. Presently the point of this descrip-
tion is that there are variations in the operational programmes of the four 
s S o m e w h a t similar criticism was voiced by participants in the international 
seminar at Lahore. Food and Agricultural organizat ion: Report on the International 
Seminar on Integrated Rural Development. N o v e m b e r 7 3 . 
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provinces. The elements identified earlier, through, have been incor-
porated to varying degrees in all provincial programmes. For our pur-
poses these seven elements serve as evaluational criteria. 
(f) Programme Evaluation: Methodological Issues 
The term evaluation has a deceptive familiarity. It appears to be a 
simple act of assessing a condition or an outcome according to established 
norm. Its complexities surface when these steps are consciously carried 
out and the judgements thus derived have to be objectively defined. 
Broadly, programme evaluation can be defined as an act of measur-
ing the performance of a programme (or project) against its promise. 
This process consists of three steps: 
(i) Measurement of performance or output. 
(h) Judging outputs against stated objectives and/or standards. 
(iii) Assessing the changes brought about by the realization of ob-
jectives. 
Each step is entangled in methodological problems. Programme 
outputs often turn out to be intractable if the rule of distinguishing bet-
ween caused and coincidental effects is applied in observing and measuring 
th^m. Project analysts call this " w i th" and " without" rule. Mere 
" before " and " after " comparisons on selected indices do not prove 
that observed changes were caused by a programme. Rarely can one 
find conditions conducive to the observance of this rule. 
Programmes forms a small segment of a stream of social and .economic 
developments and it is seldom possible to establish adequate centrals to 
isolate their effects. The second best solution to this problem is to ensure 
that the acclaimed results logically follow the programme effects. Cons-
truction of valid indices of change, quantification of observations and 
obtaining time series data, etc. are familiar problems of social measure-
ment which also plague programme evaluation. 
Judging outcome of a programme against some predetermined cri-
teria is the second step in programme evaluation. It is a normative analysis 
which depends on the sensitivity of criteria. This raises a question about 
the nature and source of criteria. Normally criteria are derived from 
objectives. But this statement again begs the question. Programme 
objectives are vague and often incapable of yielding precise measures of 
their fulfilment. Thus, an evaluator has to understand conceptual and 
contextual basis of avowed objectives to deduce criteria. Finally, an 
evaluation should throw some light on the intended and unintended con-
sequences of a project or programme on the system at large. 
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Another complication arises from the heirarchical structure of objec-
tives. Programme objectives are linked to sectoral objectives which in 
turn dovetail towards social goals such as welfare, justice, growth etc. 
An evaluator has to establish the level of objectives by which outcomes 
will be judged.7 He can employ programme or sectoral or national 
objectives as criteria. This is a crucial methodological decision. Reliance 
on low level programme objectives as evaluational criteria fails to provide 
judgements about the social worthiness of a programme. Such an eval-
uation often results in the proverbial situation of counting trees but miss-
ing the forest, whereas higher order objectives may be so far removed from 
a programme that its impact (on them) would be barely detectable. 
These methodological problems are dealt according to the nature of a 
programme and the purpose of evaluation. If the inputs and outputs of 
a programme can be measured quantitatively, then cost-effectiveness or 
cost/benefit type of analysis can be used with good results. Otherwise, 
logical analysis and iterative procedures can be applied to measure and 
judge programme performance. Such a procedure is outlined in Diagram I. 
The method outlined in this diagram suggests that programme outputs 
will be evaluated on performance criteria deduced from its objectives. The 
findings from this first round of evaluation are then further examined in 
the light of sectoral objectives or to uncover links between programme 
performance and social goals. It is a logical analysis which attempts to 
place the results of a programme in a broader context. 
Positions taken on these methodological issues are also determined 
by the purpose and timing of an evaluation. A study can be undertaken 
to assess effectiveness of a programme or to determine its feasibility or to 
diagnose its problems. Similarly it can be ex-antes concurrent or ex-post 
to a programme. And timing of a study itself is indicative of its purpose. 
In this section we have set down the basic parameters of an evalua-
tional study. The specific features of our study on these parameters will 
be discussed in the next section. 
(g) Scope and Method of Study 
Almost every five years or so a new catchy programme sweeps through 
the halls of international agencies raising hopes to revolutionize rural areas 
but making little dent in rural poverty and misery. When one idea 
runs out its course another one arises to sustain planners' optimism. In 
early 60's Community Development was eulogized as a penacea for rural 
ills. Now one seldom hears of it. Today Integrated Rural Development 
'There are two schools of thought about what const i tutes an appropriate level 
of objectives. One holds that avaluation should stay c lose to the explicit objectives 
of a programme, while the other advocates appraising even national goals . O . E . C . D . 
The Evaluation of Technical Assistance. Paris 1969, p. 19. 
Nat i ina l Goal s 








is the inspiration for hope. Will the cycle repeat itself ? This is a depres-
sing thought, but it deserves a fair-minded and objective investigation. 
This study aims to evaluate the IRDP in Pakistan. As Markaz is 
the primary instrument of implementing the programme, the evaluation 
for all practical purposes will determine the effectiveness of this concept. 
It is not the purpose of this study to pass judgement about the success or 
failure of the programme. Rather it is to observe the programme in opera-
tion and assess its viability. The intent is to identify strengths and weak-
nesses of the programme. It is a diagnostic study meant to provide a feed 
back to promoters of the programme. This objective is all the more rele-
1 2 
vant, because the study is being conducted concurrently with the pro-
gramme.8 This study addresses itself to two broad questions: 
(a) Is Markaz fulfilling the functions assigned to it? 
(b) How have the people experienced the Markaz programme? 
What benefits or difficulties do people perceive in this programme? 
The first question requires obtaining detailed information about the 
accomplishments of Markazes from official sources. For example, it 
means collecting data about the numbers of co-operative societies formed, 
amounts of loans advanced and seeds distributed or public works schemes 
completed. These data are treated as indices of accomplishments. 
To answer the second question, two in-depth case studies of Mar-
kazes, one each in N.W.F.P. and Punjab provinces, have been prepared. 
Two interview schedules were designed, incorporating questions about 
seven earlier identified dimensions of respective (provincial) Markaz con-
cepts. These were used to interview representative community informants 
in four sampled villages of each Markaz area. These data have been 
analyzed and examined in reference to the objectives of the programme. 
The latter serve as evaluational criteria. 
In the preceding sections of this chapter, the assumptions and con-
ceptual framework of this study have been extensively discussed. To 
present an overall picture of the conceptual framework of this study these 
findings have been consolidated in Chart II. 
The intended programme outputs (Col. I l l of Chart II) of a Markaz 
are taken to be indices of performance. For each of these indices, data 
have been collected. These data will be analyzed and assessed according to 
the criteria inherent in the element of Markaz concept (Column II of 
Chart II). The elements expressed in interogative form serve as criteria. 
For example, we will judge the actual postings of departmental staff on the 
criteria on of whether this activity has promoted centrality in the Markaz 
aria. As centrality itself is an expression of the objective to introduce 
modern agricultural practices, the findings from the above procedure will 
be further analyzed and assessed in terms of their contribution to those 
objectives Col. I of Chart II). These procedures will yield the necessary 
judgements about the effectiveness of Markaz as an instrument of the 
IRDP programme. 
oThe need for evaluation and feed-back studies was stressed by the members of ttaa 
International Seminar in Lahore. See F .A .O. Op. Cit. p-30. 
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Chart II 
IRDP INSTRUMENTAL ELEMENTS OF MARKEZ INTENDED PROGRAMME 
OBJECTIVES CONCEPT OUTPUT 
] 4 
Chapter II 
INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PUNJAB 
(a) Introduction 
The Punjab's IRDP was bred in Shadab pilot project of Lahore teh-
sil. Its objectives, organization and procedures were initially worked out 
in the project area.' Within a year of its establishment (August 1971) 
the Shadab model was adopted for a province wide programme of In-
tegrated Rural Development. 
The main thrust of the IRDP in the Punjab is to improve agricultural 
production.2 Its short term objectives envisage organization of co-
operatives, preparation of production plans, delivery of seed, fertilizer and 
credit and construction of storage facilities. In the long run the scope 
of the IRDP is to be extended to such activities as farmers' training, es-
tablishment of feeder markets, development of agro-industries, low cost 
housing etc. The programme objectives are a curious mixture of speci-
fic organizational proposals (e.g. storage facilities) and philosophical goals 
(cultural self-reliance). Generally objectives merely spell out institutional 
arrangements to implement the programme thus emphasizing means rather 
than ends. 
The emphasis on means as objectives has bearing on evaluational 
procedures. On the one hand if achievements are to be measured against 
the given programme objectives then one would end up listing the organi-
zations and institutions established under the programme. On the other 
a search for appropriate measures of programme outputs would lead one 
into the uncertain terrain of guessing the intents and purposes of the pro-
gramme. Our methodological position on these issues was outlined in 
the first chapter. We have identified seven programme dimensions and a 
set of instrumental objectives to assess the effectiveness of the programme. 
The influence of the Shadab model is also visible in the organiza-
tional set up of the 1RDP. A Markaz is the basic organizational unit of 
the programme. It consists of an area office headed by a project, mana-
ger (usually an agriculture graduate) who supervises a team of 5 to 10 
development assistants (also agriculture graduates), 2—6 co-operative 
inspectors and an occassional engineering assistant. Each development 
assistant is assigned to a union council or an equivalent number of villages. 
The primary role of a development assistant is that of an extension agent. 
'Compare programme objectives given in Directorate o f Integrated Rural D e v e -
lopment Punjab "Review of Progress July 1972—March 1975. Lahore (Undated) 
pp 1—2 with Shadab pilot project. The mother institution of Integrated Rural Deve-
lopment Programme. PP 4—5 Printed at Lahore Caxton Printing Press (Undated) . 
zThe objectives o f the I R D P are described in appendix A . 
t 
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He pursuades and advises farmers in the use of fertilizers, new varieties 
of seed and modern farming practices. With the assistance of co-opera-
tive inspectors, he organizes multi-purpose co-operative societies. Village 
co-operative societies are conceived as citizens' forums to identify local 
needs and to meet those needs through mutual help and governmentai 
assistance. At the apex of the co-operative structure is the Markaz fede-
ration constituted by the representatives of village societies. 
The project office at the Markaz centre is the hub of public and pri-
vate developmental activities. It co-ordinates functions and programmes 
of various nation-building departments, mobilizes the local population 
for co-operative action and dispenses advice and materials to raise agri-
cultural production. These are broadly the structural features of a Markaz. 
How it actually functions will be examined later. 
Table 2-1 
Budgetary Allocations in Punjab 
Allocations 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 
(Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.) (Rs.) 
Total for all Markazes . . 1400202 3220167 6574673 4039491 
No. of Markazes . . 19 37 37 37 
Average per Markaz . . 73695 80032 177694 109175 
Source: Directorate o f the I R D P , Punjab. 
(b) The Programme in Operation 
By June 1976, there were 38 Markazes operating in the Punjab. 
Over a period of four years (since July 1972) the programme has been ex-
tended to all districts of the province. In the first year of the programme 
19 markazes were established, approximately one in each district; by the 
third year the number of Markazes had double [see Appendix B]. 
The mean population (1972) of a Markaz area in Punjab was 134,592. 
On the average a Markaz includes 53 villages and extends over an area of 
129,055 acres, about 200 sq. miles. 
The budgetary allocations are an index of public commitment to a 
programme. On examining the IRDP on this index, it was found that 
1 6 
the mean budgetary allocation per year increased up to 1974-75 but it 
declined sharply in 1975-76. It is too early to conclude that some disen-
chantment with the programme has set in. But this trend deserves to be 
watched carefully (Table 2-1). 
An average budgetary allocation of about Rs. 1.00 to 1.25 lakh per year 
for a Markaz barely meets staffing expenses. There are ro funds to stock 
seed and fertilizer, to maintain a fleet of tractors or to carry out minor 
civil works. This situation has turned Markazes into co-ordinative 
and advisory agencies whose credibility depends on their pursuasive 
capabilities. 
(c) Supply of Agricultural Inputs 
To arrange for the supply of improved seed and fertilizer, has been 
a major activity of the Markazes. The provincial Directorate lists these 
as major accomplishments of the programme and supports such claims 
with data about quantities of seeds and fertilizer distributed every year. 
From this data two ratio indices have been computed. One measures the 
amount of wheat seed distributed for each acre of land cultivated under 
wheat. The second expresses the ratio of fertilizer distributed to the total 
cultivated area [Appendix Table B-l], Notwithstanding biases of data 
collection, the ratio of wheat seed to the cultivated area under wheat is a 
more reliable measure than the ratio of fertilizer to total cultivated area. 
The latter should be expressed in units of chemical nutrients. A weight 
measure of the quantity of fertilizer is a very crude index of the nutrient 
inputs. With these caveats about indices, it may be observed that the aver-
age ratio of wheat seed per acre of cultivated area in wheat was 0 25 mds. 
whereas the rule of thumb of 1 md. of seed per acre requires it to be 1.00. 
This suggests that Markazes supplied 25 percent of the needed seed on the 
average, though the performance of individual Markazes ranged from 
1 to 75%. 
Given the fact that most of the farmers rely on their own farm pro-
duced seed, supplying 25 percent of needed seed is a notable achievement. 
The ratio of fertilizer per acre of cultivated land was 0.12 metric 
tons. Crude as it is, this index shows Markazes had become a major 
channel for the distribution of fertilizer. 
It must be mentioned that the distribution policies were based on a 
"first come first served " principle and there were no individual quotas 
for farmers in a Markaz area. It, therefore, means that some farmers 
obtained all their needed supplies from Markaz and others got too little 
or none. All in all, it can be deduced from these observations that Mar-
kazes were supplying a substantial proportion of agricultural inputs 
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in respective areas, assuming the accuracy of our assumptions about the 
figures.3 
(d) Co-operative Societies 
In the absence of local government institutions, village co-operative 
soc eties have been organized to articulate people's needs, represent local 
int rests in public bodies and mobilize financial resources to undertake 
development projects. They are also meant to serve as channels for dis-
seminating information, advice and modern farming practices among Mar-
kaz populations. Paradoxically, these functions were compromised to 
some extent, by making co-operative societies subservient to the Provin-
cial Co-operative Department. This step is likely to reduce Markaz 
co-operatives to savings and credit institutions which have a long history of 
failures. Presently, we will examine the scope of co-operatives in the pro-
vincial IRDP. 
Table B-3 of the appendix presents Markaz wise data about number 
of organized and registered societies, ratios of share to working capital 
and a/erages of share and working capital per organized society. A table 
of provincial averages on these indices has been abstracted (Table 2-2). 
Table 2-2 
Co-operative Societies Organized Under the IR DP 
N o . o f A v . N o . o f A v . N o . of Rat io of A v . Share A v . Working 
Markazes Organized Registered Share Capital Capital 
Soc ie t ies Societ ies Working per per 
per Markaz per Markaz Capital Organized Organized 
Society Society 
38 35 26 0.27 Rs . 1600 Rs . 5860 
Source : Directorate of the I R D P , Punjab. 
Although there is a wide variation (range 3 to 80) around the mean 
for the province, the overall average for the number of organized societies, 
3There is some ambiguity about the figures from which these indices have been 
computed. It is not clear if the amounts of seeds and fertil izers mentioned refer to the 
totals distributed in Markaz areas by all agencies or if they refer strictly to the 
quantities distributed through Markazes. Generally it is the practice o f the I R D P 
progress reports to include a lmost every development that might have occurred 
in a Markaz area, irrespective of w h o was responsible, for these achievements . 
Anyway in comput ing these indices, we have taken a charitable view of the Markazes* 
achievements and have assumed that the reported amounts o f fertilizers and seed 
were strictly those distributed by Markaz offices. 
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35 per Markaz, is impressive. It reflects a fair degree of succe s in setting 
up new co-operative societies. That about 28 percent fall in the average 
number of co-operative societies between the organization and registra-
tion stages may be an indication of the attitude with which the Provincial 
Co-operative Department responded to the initiatives of the IRDP. 
These societies seem to have limited resources. An average share 
capital of Rs. 1600 per society indicates a low level of local savings. 
With credit from the co-operative bank, societies resources are replenished 
to bring the average working capital to Rs 5860. Still, these are not 
adequate financial resources to undertake major developmental works. 
Seemingly, the IRDP has succeeded in organizing numerous co-operative 
groups, but has not been able to raise enough resources to make them 
organs of local development. They remain small credit institutions. 
(e) Physical Infrastructure 
The IRDP in Punjab does not have any provision for undertaking 
construction projects. A Markaz is conceived as a planning and co-ordi-
native unit which depends on the people's works programme to implement 
its physical development proposals. Supposedly markaz proposals will 
be given high priority in the Annual district Works Programmes. This 
assumption, seemingly, is not borne out by facts. 
Table 2-3 shows that IRDP had made very little contribution in the 
development of rural infra-structure. About twelve miles of pacca road 
per Markaz or one village in a Markaz obtaining potable water do not 
indicate any quickening of the developmental pace. It is not unlikely 
Table 2-3 
Selected Indices of Physical Development 
Length of Length of No. of No. of 
Pacca road Katcha villages villages pro-
Areas per road electrified vided with 
Markaz per Markaz per Markaz potable water 
per Markaz 
All Markazes with 12.6 21.3 5.4 1.2 
one or more projects miles miles 
Source: Directorate o f the I R D P , Punjab. 
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that 1 village out of 53 (average of Markaz area) may be electrified or 1 
in 53 provided with communal water supplies under Rural electrification 
and Water Supply programmes. The IRDP does not seem to have brought 
any special benefits in this regard. 
(f) Co-ordination of Public Services 
A Markaz is conceived as an administrative unit to bring together 
the expertise of various Nation Building Departments and forge a co-ordi-
nated system of public programmes to help the development of the area. 
Posting of departmental representatives at a Markaz is a pre-requisite for 
the emergence of such a system. Using postings as an index of the co-
ordinative effort, Table 2-4 has been constructed to reflect the lRDP's 
accomplishments. 
Table 2-4 shows that two types of functionaries were posted more 
frequently. One, the representatives of agriculture related departments 
and second, newly formed departments which were opening field offices, 
e.g., Family Planning, and Social Welfare. 
The entrenched and powerful departments such as Revenue, Educat-
ion and Local Government did not attain even 50 percent representation 
at Markazes. Furthermore, it must be understood that posting of a func-
tionary did not mean that he had been exclusively assigned to a Markaz 
area. Often it meant adding Markaz to an existing jurisdiction. How 
much did posted representatives respond to Markaz needs is a qualitative 
question. Some answers to it will be forthcomming in the case study. 
This brief analysis of the structure and accomplishments of the Punjab's 
IRDP reveals that the programme is essentially supplementing the market 
and public channels for the supply of agricultural inputs. It seems to have 
inspired some popular confidence, in the beginning, which is evident from 
the success in organizing village co-operatives. Yet many institutional 
and resource constraints have also been revealed by this analysis. The 
annual reoorts of Markazes credit to the programme made accomplish-
ments which were only peripherally influenced, if at all, by the programme. 
Rural areas are undergoing development through various sectoral pro-
grammes and secular market and social trends. Therefore, to claim every 
new school or tubewell in a Markaz area as the accomplishment of the 
programme is not a valid assumption. Very few of these so called accom-
plishments will pass the " with " and "without" test. 
This foregoing r'view of provincial activities describes the strategy 
and operational thrust of the programme. It reveals little about the func-
tioning of Markazes and leaves unanswered questions about the effecti-
veness of the programme. These topics will be pursued through the 
case study of a typical Markaz. 
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Case Study of Manawala Markaz 
Manawala is the name of a small town located on the main highway 
connecting Lahore and Lyallpur. It is situated at about 44 miles from 
Lahore and 22 miles west of Sheikhupura. The Markaz established in 
this area has been named after the town which serves as the centre. The 
Markaz extends over an area of about 120Sq. miles, organized in 9 Union 
Councils, 29 main villages and 90 sub-villages. This is the heartland of 
the irrigated Punjab. About 86 percent of the Markaz area is cultivatable 
commanded land (71236 acres) irrigated by canals and tubewells. 
The Markaz was established in October 1972 and it has been operat-
ing for the last four years. It is not a pilot project where special attention 
and resources are invested. It is accessible from but not too near Lahore. 
These features commended this Markaz for our case study. 
Two types of data were collected for this case study. One set of in-
formation pertained to the operations and achievements of the project. 
The Markaz office records and interviews with Markaz officials and re-
presentatives of other nation building departments were sources of this 
data The second source of data was a formal field survey of community 
informants in four selected villages.4 Twenty two interviews were carried 
out in these villages on a predesigned interview schedule. [Appendix-E.l 
This interview schedule included questions on each of the seven elements 
of the Markaz programme. The interviewees were specifically requested 
to articulate community sentiments in response to questions and refrain 
from giving, merely, personal opinions. Thus these 22 interviews repre-
sent collective responses of various interest groups in these four villages. 
Data obtained through these interviews ha/e been primarily used to assess 
the impact of the Markaz on the local population. 
The respondent's occupations and social statuses are presented in 
Appendix Tables B-4 and B-5. Occupationally, the respondents represented 
a cross-section of rural community [Appendix Table B-4], About thirty 
two percent were engaged in high income pursuits such as arhat in nearby 
towns, big land owners, etc. The same proportion represented middle 
level rural occupations such as teachers, Imams and medium farmers 
etc. Village shopkeepers, small farmers and non-agricultural labour 
4This is a deliberately chosen technique. Given the communal and familistic struc-
tures o f Pakistan villages, it was assumed that sampling various community interests by 
identifying and interviewing their representative will be a valid and economical way to 
obtain data. 
In selecting respondents, care was taken to find representatives of various social 
groups in i village. They were repeatedly reminded that their responses should not 
necessarily reflect their personal opinions but should mirror feelings of their particular 
group/caste. The interviews were conducted in a group situation. Often the recorded 
responses were consensual opinions of the group. These group interviews o f community 
informants are not to be treated as a sample of individual households [Also See 
Appendix D] , 
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constituted 13 and 22 percent of the respondents respectively. The res-
pondents were predominantly (50 percent) influential in their respective 
clans or villages [Appendix Table B-5], Another 31.8 percent were 
intermediate level leaders, such as Imam Masiids, literate village shop-
keepers, etc. This bias towards influential among the respondents is 
contingent upon our interviewing approach. We sought out community 
and interest group leaders as informents of respecthe group feelings. 
Among the respondents were also office bearers and members of Markaz 
sponsored Co-operative Societies. These procedures have lent a bias in 
the selection of respondents. But this bias will be, if anything, favour-
able to the IRDP. 
(i) Centrality : By concentrating public sevices and commercial 
facilities at the centre, a Markaz is expected to establish a growth 
point and produce the momentum for rural transformation. The town 
of Manawala was the centre of the Markaz area. Apart from the 
Markaz offices, it had a bus stop, a bazar, banks, a dispensary, a carpet 
weaving training centre and numerous offices of the nation building de-
partments. Did these facilities and services make Mana wala a central 
place for the sub-region ? Table 2-5 sums up modal responses to a battery 
of questions about the places where people went to obtain certain goods 
and services 'before' and 'after' the establishment of the IRDP. Any 
significant change in these shopping patterns indicates the reordering 
of central places in the region. 
Column I of the table lists a heirarchical order of goods and services. 
The rank order increases going down the column. A comparison of 
columns 2 and 3 reveals a noticeable shift towards Manawala for agri-
cultural supplies. It emerges as the centre for extension services and credit, 
etc. These were the most vigorously pursued activities of the programme. 
Interestingly, a mild decentralizing tendency is also visible. For banking 
and fertilizer/seed distribution, Panwan, a small roadside market had 
emerged as a centre after the IRDP. This is an indication of a secular 
trend of expansion and filtering down of banks and seed depots. Overall, 
Manawala did not attract many central functions except sen ices directly 
dispensed by the Markaz. This finding is further confirmed by responses 
to another question. Respondents were asked to name ser\ ices for which 
the people had been going to Manawala both before and after the IRDP. 
Their responses indicate that(i) there was little change in the nature of 
activities for which Manawala served as the centre; (ii) the detectible 
change pertained to the IRDP related services [Appendix Table B-6]. 
(ii) Integration of Services: Assignment of departmental represen-
tatives to a Markaz is considered to be the first step in attaining integra-
tion of service. Out of 24 departments whose representatives were 
expected to be posted at Manawala, 8 (33 percent) had functionaries in 
the area before the IRDP, 6 (25 percent) did not assign any one and 10 
(42 percent) posted their officials to cover the area after the establishment 
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of the Markaz. Among the latter were four banks, and the departments 
of Social Welfare, Population Planning, Food, Malaria Eradication 




Goods & Services 
Before IRDP After 1RDP 
1. Groceries, meat & ve-
getables Village 68.2%* Village 63.6% 
2. Clothes . . Village 63.6% Village 63.6% 
3. Shoes Village 27.3% 
Manawala 27.3% 
Manawala 40.9% 
4. Fertilizer/Seed Manawala 45.5% Panwan 59.1% 
5. Mandi Village 31.8% Manawala 54.5% 
6. Repair of Machinery Not in vogue/ 
Not appli-
cable 36.4% Manawala 63.6% 
7. Agricultural Credit . . Sheikhu-
pura 45.5% Manawala 59.1% 
8. Extension Services Not known/ 
Not in 








Village 54.5% Village 31.8% 
10. Bank Sheikhu- 31.8% 
pura 
Panwan 31.8% Panwan 50.0 




madpura 36.4% madpura 36.4% 
& others and others. 
Manawala 36.4% 
Source : T h e Village Survey . 
•Percentages are Modal responses for each item. For examp'e the most c o m m o n 
response to he quest ion, where do people buy c'othes, was village; which was men-
tioned by 63.6 % of the respondents. 
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expanding their facilities all around and the rest are new departments 
fanning out in the country side. Thus, favourably responding agen-
cies were primarily seeking new territories to extend their activities. 
On the other hand, there was a predominance of established and 
bureaucratically secure departments among those who did not post 
representatives at the Markaz, e.g., revenue, Highways, Education, 
etc. Obviously the IRDP did not carry much weight with the entrenched 
bureaucracies. Yet their responsiveness to people's needs is a pre-
requisite for rural development. It was repeatedly said in interviews 
that if there was to be any change in public institutions, it must begin 
with patwaris, irrigation overseers and tubewell operators. 
Does posting of departmental representatives at a Markaz achieve 
integration? It is possible that physical proximity may induce co-ordina-
tion among departments. But the integration is essentially an institutional 
quality. It must be incorporated in the departmental procedures. Bu-
reaucracies are notoriously jealous of their functional preserves. Manan-
wala's experience bears it out. The Markaz was extended some co-
operation by other departments in the beginning. As a Mar.kaz official 
put it, the initial co-operation was forthcoming as a result of uncertainly 
about the powers of the IRDP. For a while, it appeared that the IRDP 
might become a super department. Once this impression was dispelled, 
the interdepartmental co-operation slackened if not disappeared. Initial-
ly, the representatives of the nation building departments used to turn 
up at meetings called by the project manager. Of late, the meetings 
have fallen in disuse. 
Table 2-6 
Improvement in Availability oj Goods and Services 






Seeds 14 63.6 8 36.4 
Fertilizer 15 68.2 7 31.8 
Agricultural Advice 10 45.5 12 54.5 
Drinking Water 2 9.1 20 90.9 
Agricultural Credit 12 54.5 10 45.5 
Livestock Care 4 18.2 18 81.8 
Irrigation Water 1 4.5 21 95.5 
Medical clinic . . 1 4.5 21 95.5 
Bank . . 17 77.3 5 22.7 
Co-operative Society 8 36.4 14 63.6 
Source : The Village Survey. 
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Even when a departmental representative was posted at Manawala, 
it did not mean that Markaz area was his only concern. Often the Markaz 
area was added to a pre-existing functional jurisdiction. Similarly Markaz 
priorities had little bearing on the departmental plans. The officials of 
nation building departments at Manawala indicated that they were guided 
by their respective departmental goals and Markaz figured very little in 
their work. Markaz had failed to bring down inter-departmental barriers. 
This is also evident from responses to a question about the improvements 
in the availability of services. 
Table 2-6 shows that the major improvements were registered only 
in the supply of agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, advice and 
credit. As we have discussed earlier, Markaz did play some part in in-
creasing the supply of agricultural inputs. But equally important were 
general market trends of increased demand and supply of these factors. 
This conclusion is also borae out by respondents, explanations for the 
reported improvements. 
An overwhelming majority of respondents (86.4 percent) thought 
that Markaz was not responsible for the increased availability of 
services (Table 2-7). 
Table 2-7 
Reasons for Change in the Availability of Services 
Reasons Number Percentage 
I. Initiative of Markaz . . 1 4.5 
II. Factors other than Markaz . . 19 86.4 
III. No change/negative change . . 2 9.1 
Total: 22 100 
Source : The Village survey. 
All this evidence adds up to the conclusion that the Markaz had 
only integrated agricultural services. In this sector also its contribution 
consolidated gains which were already underway. The multisectoral 
integration of services escaped the IRDP. 
(iii) Simultaneous Delivery of Agricultural Inputs : Manawala 
Markaz initiated a number of activities to provide various agricultural 
inputs. Apart from distributing seed, fertilizers and tree saplings, 
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tractors and threshers were rented out, credit and advice were made 
available, and a mandi (market) committee was established in Mana-
wala. There are two note worthy features of these efforts. One, 
these were mostly on going activities which Markaz conveniently 
took over. Second, the scale of these operations was small compared 
to the need as well as demand. This point is well illustrated by the 
fact that in two years of operations, tractors were rented out for 
413 and 494 hours respectively. This effort contrasts with the fact 
that in one village alone 14 tractors were available for rent and 
those were being run profitably; such was the business. Renting of 
tractors by Markaz was neither an innovation nor a significant contri-
bution toward unmet demand. A similar pattern is evident in the 
establishment of Mandi at Manawala. The proposal had been 
initiated long before the IRDP by a local influential who had a 
vested interest in subdividing his land for commercial develop-
ment. Markaz's contribution was limited to writing a few supportive 
letters. 
What we had observed earlier is again validated. Markaz per-
formed supplemental functions. It took over some on-going activities. 
Its activities were not guided by any plan or strategy to provide simul-
taneity and concentration of agricultural services. They were reactive 
rather than innovative. 
There were some essential agricultural inputs whose simultaneous 
availability was much in demand, irrigation water being the most 
obvious of those. The respondents expressed exasperation at the 
irregularity of water supply fr^m canals and tubewells. Yet Markaz did 
not initiates any organized and planned effort to regulate the supply 
of this essential input. From the Markaz's activities, one does not 
discern any pattern of concerted and inter-related effort. This is why 
the Markaz's impact on agricultural production was marginal, at best. 
Table 2-8 shows that the majority of respondents (54.8 percent) 
thought that wheat production had registered increases of 25 to 100%. 
On the contrary about 21 percent indicated that the production had 
decreased to varying degrees. These two apparently contradictory 
response reflect the paradoxical situation in which some villages were 
caught. In the same village, canal irrigated lands were very produc-
tive, whereas land watered by SCARP tubewells was almost barren 
due to brackish or irregular supplies. 
Reasons given to explain the increase of the agricultural yield varied, 
but better seed and liberal use of fertilizer were said to be the primary 
factors in improving production (Table 2-9). Other inputs such as 
advice, co-operatives and credit were considered to be minor factors 
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in increasing the yield. On the other hand, the fall in the yield in 
some cases was attributed to the shortfall of irrigation water supply 
(Table 2-9). The note-worthy aspect of these explanations is that the 
IRDP was held to be a marginal factor in bringing about improve-
ments or causing short falls. 
Table 2-8 
Change in Wheat Porduction 
Change Number Percentage 
Decrease upto 25% 2 9.1 
Decrease 25 % and above 3 13.7 
No change 1 4.5 
Increase upto 25% 3 13.7 
Increase 25 % and above 12 54.5 
N o Response 1 4.5 
Total : 22 100.0 
Source: The Vi l lage Survey. 
Table 2-9 
Reasons for Change in Wheat Production 
Reasons Number Percentage 
Better Seeds and Fertilizer . . 11 50.0* 
Better advice and organization 2 9.1 
Better Water Supply 2 9.1 
Due to IRDP initiated changes/Markaz 
induced improvements. 2 9.1 
Decrease due to short fall in water supply . 5 22.7 
Other reasons 3 13.6 
Source : The Village Survey. 
•These are independent responses to separate questions. They do not add up to 
100 percent. 
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(iv) Organization and Mobilization of People : The co-operative 
movement dates back to 1905 in Punjab. Its chequered history of 
inaction and mismanagement inspires little faith in its effectiveness. 
The IRDP relying on co-operative societies to mobilize people, gene-
rate resources and initiate collective action to solve area problems. 
How are co-operatives functioning under the IRDP. Manawala 
area had 52 co-operative societies ante-dating the IRDP. Since the 
establishment of the Markaz, 51 have been organized under the 
programme. This is an impressive organizational effort in a short span 
of four years.5 
Table 2-10 
Co-operative Societies in Manawala 
Share Working 
Societ ies Members Capital Capital 
per Society per Society 
( N o . ) ( N o . ) (Rs.) (Rs. ) 
Co-operat ive Societies before 
I R D P . 52 2335 2480 22747* 
Village Co-operatives 
sponsored by Markaz. 51 1786 1261 2130 
Markaz Federation 1 15 3750 3750 
Source : Markaz Office Manawala 
"Includes one banking union with large working capital. 
To examine the possibility that Markaz sponsored co-operative societies 
might be fairing better than the older institutions, comparative data 
about the two sets of co-operative societies is presented in Table 2-10. 
It shows that Markaz co-operative societies had less working and share 
capital, on the average, than the ones formed earlier. Similarly Markaz 
organized co-operative societies had fewer members per society (35)than 
the older ones(42). Add to these findings the fact that all village co-
operatives were organized by Markaz in the early years of the project. 
In the period 1974-76, not single new one had been organized. From these 
observations a pattern is discernible. The Markaz was initially greeted 
with some anthusiasm, at least among some sections of the local popula-
tion. It might have been inspired by expectations of gains from a new 
programme. Once the programme's identity and approach became 
known, the familiar apathy set in 
sThere was evidence that some of these Markaz sponsored Co-operatives were really 
societies established earlier which had been rechristened by the Markaz. 
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To determine whether Markaz sponsord co-operative societies were 
functioning as mobilizers of people and promotors of local actions, the 
records of two village co-operatives, randomly chosen, were examined. 
In both cases, the meetings were held at four month intervals on the 
average, and the decisions recorded in the minutes were either procedural 
or advisory in nature. Over a period of two and a half years, for which 
records were available, resolutions were passed requesting the project 
manager to arrange for the supply of seed and fertilizer. There was no 
mention of any other need or proposal. This performance does not indi-
cate a promising start for the Markaz organized co-operatives. 
The question of the co-operative's effectiveness as pursued in the 
village survey. The respondents were asked to indicate if they knew 
about the existence and activities of a Markaz sponsored co-operative 
society in their villages. 
Table 2-11 shows that very few respondents (22.7%) knew about a 
Markaz sponsored co-operative society, though a majority (68.2) percent 
mentioned co-operatives predating Markaz. Incidentally, three of the 
four sampled villages had Markaz organized co-operatives. These res-
ponses indicate that Markaz co-operatives have remained preserves of a 
few persons. 
Table 2-11 
Knowledge of Co-operative Society 
Knowledge Number Percentage 
Know of a Co-operative Society not affi- IS 68.2 
liated with Markaz 
Know of a Markaz Sponsored Society . . 5 22.7 
Do not know of any . . . . 2 9.1 
Total : 22 100.0 
Source: The Vi l lage Survey. 
The activities of Markaz co-operatives were not much different from 
what rural co-operatives have been doing for a long time. Giving of loans 
was the only activity (of the co-operatives) mentioned by respondents. A 
battery of questions about the activities of co-operatives drew out barely 
any response. Respondents repeatedly said that co-operatives have done 
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nothing, except to give credit to members and occasionally distribute seed 
and fertilizer. These responses do not communicate the sense that co-
operatives were people's associations to mobilize resources and undertake 
collective projects. So blase was the reaction to the mention of co-opera-
tives, that only 36 percent of respondents could name a member of a 
co-operative society or had some idea of a society's activities [Appendix 
Table B-7]. 
(v) Social Awareness and Local Leadership : Rural development 
means raising people's consciousness about their rights, potentialities and 
developing local institutions to solve their problems. The IRDP incor-
porates numerous measures aimed at promoting local initiative and 
fostering indigenous leadership. Co-operative societies, model farmers and 
training of village leaders, are the more formalized forms of these mea-
sures. There are two levels at which people's awareness of Markaz can 
be observed: First their knowledge of the existence and purpose of the 
programme; Second, their understanding of and trust in the Markaz 
sponsored institutions to lead local development. To assess the first 
level of awareness respondents were asked: who knew about the Markaz 
in their villages. The modal response was that every body knew about 
the Markaz [Appendix Table B-8]. Undoubtedly Markaz programme 
was widely known. There was barely an information or communication 
gap. This fact itself is a testimony to people's awareness about what 
goes on in their area. This is further confirmed by the evidence pre-
sented in the Table below. 
Table 2-12 
Acquaintance of Markaz Officials 
Response Number Percentage 
Can not identify any official or know of 
their visit. 5 22.7 
Familiar with officials but unaware of 
their visits. 1 4.5 
Acquainted with as well as aware of offi-
cial's visit to village. 15 68.2 
No Response 1 4.5 
Total : 22 100.0 
Source: T h e Vil lage Survey. 
31 
A large majority of respondents (68.2 percent) were familiar with 
Markaz officials and had some idea of their visits to their villages. This 
observation has dual meanings. It shows people's awan. ness and it speaks 
of officials' success in making themselves visible. Incidentally, the Mana-
wala Markaz annual reports claim that 1,18,000 farm visits were carried 
out in the past four years. 
At the level of action, the Markaz was not faring very well. Its 
measures to institutionalize local leadership and to establish channels 
for disseminating modern techniques had, by and large, failed to take hold. 
We have already discussed limitations of the co-operative societies. 
They lacked resources and did not undertake any significant task. The 
framers of the IRDP conceived of co-operative societies in multiple roles. 
One of them was to serve as channels for transmitting public information 
and modern production techniques. For this purpose, leaders or office 
bearers of co-operative societies were to be given training and guidance 
at the Markaz. They were expected to spread this infoimation in their 
villages. Similarly, model farms were meant to disseminate ideas through 
example. Officials of Manawala had conducted training and discussion 
sessions with the co-operatives' leaders and had set up 14 model farms. 
How much of this information had filtered down can be guaged from res-
pondents' knowledge about and assessment of these practices. 
Table 2-13 
Role of Co-operative Society Members 
Response Number Percentage 
Don't know 
Brings the Information 
No Member 
Does not bring the information 
Not Applicable 
Total : 
Source: The Vil lage Survey. 
Only 4.5 percent of respondents indicated that co-operative leaders bring 
back information to their villages (Table 2-13). In fact, there seems to 








the respondents were some secretaries and chairmen oi village co-opera-
tive societies and some of them had neither attended the markaz training 
sessions nor talked about those with members of their societies and other 
villagers. 
A similer diffidence prevailed about model farms. In the vicinity of 
the sampled villages, there were three model farms. Yet 81.8 percent of res-
pondents said that they were not aware of any model farm in their areas. 
When their attention was drawn to this apparent contradiction, they ex-
plained it by saying that Markaz had not done any thing on those farms 
except to put a sign board. Undoubtedly those were progressive farms, 
but they had been there much before Markaz was established. This indi-
fference to the presence of model farms is further reflected in Table 2-14. 
Table 2-14 
Influence of Model Farmer 
Influence Number Percentage 
No M 1 4.5 
Yes . . . . . . 1 4.5 
No response . . . . 20 90.9 
Total : 22 100.0 
Source: The Vi l lage Survey. 
The preponderance of ' no response' is an indication of respondents' 
indifference to the existence of model farms. 
This section has shown that people were aware of the Markaz prog-
ramme but were unenthusiastic and indifferent towards institutional 
measures taken to foster local leadership and to highten sense of 
self reliance. 
(vi) Improving Living Conditions (Infrastructural Development). The 
IRDP made no provision for carrying out minor civil works such 
as building village roads, water wells, etc. Yet promoting such develop-
ment remained an objective of the programme. It was meant to be 
realized through the People's Works Programme. Markaz was conceived 
as a planning and co-ordinating agency. Its contribution lies in articu-' 
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lating local needs and formulating an annual plan for the area which the 
People's Works Programme is to execute. Obviously it was assumed that 
Markaz proposals will carry weight with the District Works Council. 
In Manawala, the process did not operate as conceived. The Markaz 
prepared a list of proposals for new schools, village roads, culverts, lib-
raries, electrification of villages, etc. This list was just a catalogue. It 
had some estimates of costs but no explanation or documentation of prio-
rities of the proposals. This annual plan was almost whisked aside by the 
District Works Council. None of the 42 proposals submitted by the Mar-
kaz were funded by the council in two successive years. 
Contrary to apparent lack of credibility (and political clout) of the 
Markaz proposals are extensive claims in the Markaz annual reports about 
roads, tubewells, irrigation channel, etc., built in Markaz area. Apparently 
Mirkaz authorities deem it fit to take credit for almost any change occurr-
ing in the area. Usually such credit is not warranted. Most of these are 
normal developments which were merely coincidental with the Markaz. 
A case in point is the history of the establishment of carpet weaving 
training centre in Manawala. About 5-6 years ago, carpet weaving be-
came a household industry in Manawala area in response to the market 
demand. It has became so popular that many farmers have taken up this 
activity. The spontaneity of this development attracted the attention of 
the Small Industries Department. They established a training centre. 
Files in. the Mirkaz offiee contain some letters written to the Small Indus-
tries Department in support of the plan to establish the centre. Does 
this mueh activity earn the Markaz the credit for the establishment of the 
centre ? 
The annual reports of Manawala Markaz lay claims for lining water 
courses (23800 linear feet), distribution of tree saplings (63000), building 
of fish ponds (2), etc. Our study is not an administrative audit; therefore 
we can not comment on the authenticity of these claims. But one judge-
ment can be given unequivocally that very few of these accomlishments 
can be shown to have occurred entirely with the Markaz. Markaz had 
played a supplemental and supportive role. Seldom was it the initiator of 
these proposals. And what it initiated was given little attention. Quite 
obviously Mirkaz was operating on a reactive and incremental basis. Its 
performance conveyed little sense of a planned and co-ordinated approach 
to area development. 
Appendix Table B-9 shows that respondents ranked drinking water 
supply, school and roads as the priority needs of their area. This suggests 
that a formal plan for the area establishing a pattern of physical develop-
ment, setting criteria for determining priorities and formulating policies 
for resource allocation (locally mobilized or granted) would be a very 
significant contribution from a Markaz, even if it does not assume respon-
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sibilities to execute such a plan. The Markaz did not assume the role ot 
an area planning and development agency. Instead its efforts ha\e teen 
sporadic, incremental and reactive to the initiative of other nation building 
departments. It has often taken on tasks that other departments find 
burdensome; e.g. distributing tubewell subsidy application forms. 
(vii) Target Population and Beneficiaries : The medium and small 
farmers are especially mentioned in the IF DP as the target population. 
Similarly, improving the employment opportunities of the rural labourer 
is also an objective of the programme. From these two statements, it can 
be deduced that Markazes are meant to benefit the majority segment of 
rural population, i.e., the poor and lower classes, and to avoid the usual 
pitfall of being co-opted for the benefit of the rich and the influential. 
Is Markaz realizing this objective? To answer this question, Table 2-15 
is presented. 
Table 2-15 
Beneficiaries of the Markaz Projects 
Beneficiaries Number Percentage 
Big Land owners only 5 22.7 
Medium and Small farmers only 4 18.2 
Farmer (of all types) only 3 13.6 
Everybody (farmers as well as non-farmers) 5 22.7 
None 3 13.6 
No Response 2 9.1 
Total : 22 100.0 
Source: T h e Vi l lage Survey. 
The bi-modal responses in Table 2-15 present a contradictory picture. 
On the one hand 22.7 percent respondents said that big land owner were 
the main beneficiaries of the markaz programme, whereas another 22.7 
percent indicated that everybody benefitted from it. This duality of res-
ponses is partially explained by an observed correlation between a res-
pondents role in the Markaz programmes and his response. Generally, 
3 5 
the secretaries and presidents of co-operative societies or persons connec-
ted with the Markaz said that everybody benefitted from the programme, 
while those without any affiliations with the Markaz, predominantly sug-
gested that only the influential and the land lords were the beneficiaries. 
The overall meaning of the responses recorded in Table 2-15 is that the 
farming community was benefitting to some degree from the programme. 
This seems plausible if benefits are defined loosely. The possibility of 
getting advice or seeds is a validly preceived benefit. 
More light on the issue of the impact of Markaz on the opportunities 
of the poor is thrown by the data in Appendix Table B-10. 
A majority of respondents (56.4 percent) thought that there was no 
improvement in the living conditions of the poor, while 36.4 percent indi-
cated otherwise. By analysing explanations given to support respective 
judgements, we get a better picture of the role of Markaz. 
Table 2-16 
Reasons for Changes in Living Conditions of the Poor 
Reasons Number Percent 
No Change . . . . . . 12 54.5 
More non-agricultural employment oppor- 4 18.2 
tunities. 
Increased incomes from agriculture . . 2 9.1 
Other. . . . . . . . 4 18.2 
Total : 22 100.0 
Source: T h e Vi l lage Survey . 
It is evident that whatever limited improvements that some respondent 
perceived in the living conditions of the poor, were not attributed to the 
Markaz Programme. 
They were attributed to such secular trends as increasing industrial 
job opportunities, rising incomes through agricultural improvements, etc. 
Independent of these responses, it is known that carpet weaving had be-
come a rage in Manawala area. In some villages, almost every house had 
a loom or two operating throughout the day. This has certainly increased 
the incomes of a large section of the lower classes. Markaz was merely a 
coincidental event in this respect. 
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In conducting the village surveys and talking to the Markaz officials, 
we became aware that persons involved with the project tended to share 
some common characteristics. Most of the office bearers of co-opera-
tive societies, model farmers, and other local leaders had striking simila-
rities. They were, usually, persons with some schooling, often having a 
share in a business or holding a job yet maintaining roots in villages through 
ancestral farms. There were not many proverbial big landlords among 
them. There was a behaviourial characteristic shared by most of those 
associated with markaz: they had thorough familiarity with governmental 
programmes, and knew the ways of dealing with public officials. This 
is the emerging rural middle class of safaid poshes. We could detect 
a continuity in their affiliations with rural development programmes that 
have come and gone. They constitute a readily accessible local leadership 
for programme be it V-AID or Rural Works and now IRDP. 
Apparently a division of labour in leadership functions has emerged 
in rural areas. The traditional land lords have monopolized political 
offices and positions of national leadership, while the local affairs have 
fallen to the share of this new rural middle class. In Manawala, we were 
not alert to this possibility and therefore were not prepared to formally 
observe these patterns. By the time we became aware of the ring of 
safaid posh around the Markaz we had almost concluded village surveys. 
At the last moment, an effort was made to document this observation. 
For this purpose, information about the socio-economic background of 
the participants in a minor project of the Markaz was obtained. The 
markaz was setting up some demonstration plots to show the benefits of 
precision and levelling. There were twenty farmers who had accepted 
to get a few acres of their land levelled under this programme. Table 2-17 
presents educational backgrounds of these farmers. 
Table 2-17 
Educational Attainments of Farmers Participating in the Precision Land 
Levelling Demonstration Project 
Education Number Percent 
5—9 years of Schooling . . . . 9 45.0 
Matric . . . . . . 8 40.0 
Post matric College/technical training . . 3 15.0 
Total : 20 100.0 
Source: Markaz officials. 
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Although most of the participants were medium farmers, a majority 
of them had other occupations also. There were arhatis, shopkeepers, 
ration depot holders, public officials and numbardars among these parti-
cipants in the precision and levelling project. Educationally, they were a 
distinguished group by rural standards. About 55 percent of these parti-
cipants were matriculates or had higher educational attainments. Ad-
mittedly this is a small piece of evidence, but it shows the pattern of 
emerging rural local leadership. Presently it might be taken note of ; 
we will further examine this hypothesis in the case study of a Markaz 
in the N.W.F.P. where field work was done subsequently. 
Summary of Findings 
The analysis of the provincial data and the Manawala case study 
suggest certain generalized conclusions about the working of the IRDP 
in Punjab. These are presented below. 
(j) The IRDP in Punjab is turning into an agricultural extension 
programme. Partially it was intended to be so, but its structure 
pre-empted opportunities of its ever developing into a multi-
sectoral integrated development programme. 
(ii) The scope for the agricultural extension work has not been 
thoroughly analyzed. There is an emphasis on the delivery of 
the four inputs, i.e. seeds, fertilizers, advice and credit. In Pun-
jab, the supply of these inputs is relatively adequate or at least 
does not present any unusual problems. A host of public and 
commercial channels have emerged to supply these inputs and 
farmers are generally aware of their beneficial effects. Thus, a 
Markaz becomes a supplementing agency for the supply of 
these inputs. The case study also revealed that there were 
other equally crucial agricultural needs, {e.g. irrigation water) 
whose supply problems were not even addressed to by the 
Markaz. 
(iii) The integrative role of Markazes seems to have remained largely 
unfulfilled. The programme in Punjab is manned by agricul-
ture graduates. It has grown out of shadab model which was 
based on " input saturation " strategy. It has remained tied to 
the provincial Agricultural Department through formal and in-
formal links. All these factors have distracted from its mission 
of comprehensive and integrated development. The co-ordi-
nation of activities of nation building departments at the 
Markaz level could not be achieved. It is a very elusive pro-
blem which is rooted in bureaucratic power struggles, resource 
constraints and departmental priorities. The IRDP had re-
latively poor credibility among other provincial departments and 
it has failed to obtain the co-operation of entrenched bureau-
cracies such as revenue, high ways and irrigation, etc. These 
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departments have a strong hold over the rural economy and 
without their participation, the integration of public services 
is incomplete. Yet it would not be necessarily obtained by 
making Markaz officials as the super-bosses. These problems 
have not been given enough attention in the formulation of the 
IRDP. 
(iv) Markazes inspired considerable enthusiasm initially (in the first 
year). This is evidenced from a number of indicators: up-
surge in organization of co-operative societies, frequency of 
meetings, etc. Seemingly, the popular enthusiasm petered out 
after a short while. Perhaps, a misplaced emphasis on agri-
cultural advice and credit combined with inattention to other 
aspects invested the programme with an aura of irrelevance or 
insignificance. 
(v) Various institutions promoted by the Markaz, (e.g. Co-opera-
tive Societies, model farms) have not fulfilled their proposed 
functions. They have not involved people on a large-scale or 
inspired their trust. Nor have these institutions acted as two 
way channels for the flow of information and ideas between 
public bodies and the general public. Their resources remained 
limited and activities primarily organizational. 
(W) Markaz as a public programme is fairly widely known, but its 
benefits have not spread out. The Markaz Centre, Manawala 
town, did not show any tendencies to be a growth point and 
competing central places were also emerging in the area. The 
primary beneficiaries, what ever the few benefits, were farmers 
and they also were served in a sporadic and incremental man-
ner. The Markaz attempted to lay the role of an expeditor of 
on-going public programmes. In the process, it got saddled with 
a variety of chores which drain its limited manpower and dis-
tract from its overall mission. For example in Manawala. 
Markaz staff was busy at various times putting together tube-
well subsidy applications for individual farmers, or authen-
ticating applications for credit cards, etc. These activities, 
were useful by themselves but they have little bearing on the 
overall objectives of the programme. Very little planning was 
evident at the provincial or Markaz level. The possibilities of 
making Markazes sophisticated and responsive units of local 
planning had been overlooked. 
(vii) It was observed, tentatively, that an emerging class of rural 
bourgeoisie had assumed local level leadership roles. They 
formed a circle around public officials and programmes and 
were strategically placed to obtain whatever little power or ma-
terial benefits the programme confered. 
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Chapter III 
INTEGRATED RI'RAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE N.W.F.P. 
(a) The Scope of the IRDP 
The conceptual and institutional framework of the North West Fron-
tier province's IRDP is similar to that of the Punjab, but it is signifi-
cantly different in scope and emphasis. A Markaz is also the adminis-
trative unit of the frontier's IRDP. It is similarly organized in two-
tiered parallel structures of government functionarie's and citizen's asso-
ciations. The frontier's programme differs from the Punjab's in at least 
one significant way. It sets aside funds and assigns officials to carry out 
land development and infrastructural civil works in Markazes. This 
thrust of the programme is a part of the strategy evolved at Daudzai. 
Daudzai is a pilot rural development project run by the Pakistan 
Academy of Rural Development in the Daudzai police station of Peshawar 
Tehsil. Daudzai model, as it is popularly known, has an impressive 
ancestry. It draws upon the experiences of Comilla project and has evol-
ved a three-pronged strategy through experimentation in Daudzai Thana.1 
The Daudzai approach of guided local initiative was adopted as the 
basis of the provincial IRDP in 1973—almost a year after the initiation of 
the pilot project. The provincial government has proceeded cautiously 
in introducing the programme. Only four Markazes were started in the 
first year (1972-73) and the new ones were established at a deliberate pace. 
The provincial government watched the evolution of Daudzai and other 
Markazes and did not formalize its plan of action till January 1975.2 
By this time, 14 Markazes had been established. One of these earlier 
Markazes, Battal, was chosen for the case study. 
The objectives of the provincial IRDP are given in Appendix-C. 
The programme envisages that a Markaz will become a co-ordinative body 
for government departments at the local level. It provides for building 
of a Markaz complex where public offices will be housed together. It 
i The three main e lements of the strategy are ( / ) cho ice of the jurisdict ion of a pol ice 
station as a Markaz extending over 140 sq. miles area and including about 50,000 
people , on the average. This will be a unit o f deve lopment administrat ion served 
by nine departments and the Markaz staff; (ii) organizing co-operat ive societ ies 
in villages to propose and execute civil works and to serve as credit and training 
institutions; (iii) training of village cadres as extension agents. A detailed descrip-
tion of the evolut ion of Daudzai project is given in : Shoaib Sultan Khan Daudzai 
Project. Pakistan Academy for Rural Deve lopment , Peshawar, January 1975. 
zA proposal outl ining scope, phasing and procedures of the I R D P was formalized 
in January 1975. See Department of Local Government , Rural Deve lopment , C o -
operatives, Social Welfare and Tourism PCI. Rural Deve lopment in N . W . F . P . 
1975-80. 
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emphasizes organization and mobilization of people through two tiered 
co-operative societies and by training local leaders. It lays stress on the 
planning and development of physical infrastructure by co-operative so-
cieties with technical and financial assistance from the Rural Development 
Department. 
A Markaz will take five years to mature, according to the provincial 
plan.3 The first phase of Markaz development will be comprised of 
preparatory work such as staffing, surveys and construction of the office 
complex. The second phase will include organization of co-operatives, 
initiation of infrastructure development and promotion of agricultural ex-
tension. By the third year, a Markaz will enter the third phase wherein 
all activities will be intensified and broadened. This plan of Markaz 
development serves as the guide for the frontier's IRDP. The provincial 
government has formulated an ambitious programme of establishing 110 
Markazes, each incurring an expenditure of about Rs. 6.8 million (68 
lakhs) over a period of five years. 
Table 3-1 
Proposed Expenditure per Markaz Over a Five Years Period 
Items Amount (Rs.) 
Buildings . . . . . . 700,000 
Equipment and Transport . . . . 150,000 
Markaz Staff . . . . . . 736,000 
Departmental Staff . . . . 836,000 
Co-operative organization grant . . 400,000 
Infrastructural works . . . . 3,200,000 
Co-operative Credit Capital . . . . 800,000 
Total : 6,822,000 
Source: PCI p. 8. 
The scope of the IRDP is evident from the proposal to spend about 
Rs. 1.7 million every year per Markaz. Furthermore, it may be noted 
that almost half of the expenditure will be incurred on infrastructural 
3Ibid. p. 7. 
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works which indicates that civil works will be a major component of the 
programme. Does the effort match the intentions? To answer this ques-
tion, we will examine budgetary allocations of the programme. 
(b) Budgetary Allocations 
Although the provincial plan proposes a budget of Rs. ten lakh in 
the first year and Rs. fourteen lakh each year thereafter, the actual ex-
penditures have been less than half of these, on the average (Table 
3-2). 
Table 3-2 
Expenditures on Markazes 
Categories 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 
Total provincial* 
Expenditure 
Rs . 1,400,000 2 ,000,000 1,610,000 19 ,300,000 
N o . o f Markazes"* 5 9 15 34 
A v . expenditure per 
Markaz R s . 280,000 233,333 1,073,666 567,647 
Sources : "Government of Pakistan, Ministry of F inance—Rev i sed Budgets. 
* "Directorate o f Rural Deve lopment N . W . F . P . 
Not only average expenditures per Markaz have lagged behind the 
proposed budget, but also they show a downward trend since 1974-75. 
After a quantum jump to Rs. 1.07 million (ten lakhs) in 1974-75 from 
Rs. 0.2 million (2 lakhs) for the two earlier years, the average expendi-
ture per Markaz fell to Rs. 0.56 million (five lakhs) in 1975-76. Is this 
an indication of sagging provincial Commitment ? What may be noted is 
that similar phenomenon was observed in Punjab. 
Table 3-3 
Budgetary Allocations and Expenditures 
Categories 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 
Budgetary Rs . 1,500,000 2 ,100,000 24,000,000 31,700,000 15 ,000,000 
Al locat ion 
Change over pre- — + 4 0 % + 1 0 5 0 % + 3 2 % — 5 2 % 
vious year 
Expenditures Rs. 1,400,000 2 ,100,000 16,100,000 19,300,000 — 
(Revised 
estimates) 
Expenditure as 93 .3% 100.0% 50.3% 60 .9% — 
percentage of 
al location 
Source : Government of Pakistan, Ministry of F inance—Revised Budgets. 
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It may be hypothesized that organizational problems might have 
hampered utilization of budgetary allocations. Table 3-3 controverts 
this argument. It shows that the programme used up almost total allo-
cations during the first two years. The expenditures were half of the al-
location in 1974-75 but then that year the allocation increased by 1050 
percent over the previous year. The absorptive capacity of the programme 
is evident from the fact that in 1974-75 the expenditures increased by 
666 percent over the previous years. Against these trends, the fall in allo-
cations—both average and absolute—in the last two years does point 
toward some downgrading of the IRDP in provincial priorities. How 
has the programme performed so far ? This question leads us to 
examine provincial data on co-operative, and works programmes. 
(c) Markaz Co-operative Societies in the N.W.F.P. 
The IRDP relies heavily on village co-operative societies to fulfill its 
objectives. They are envisioned as people's organizations responsible for 
initiating and implementing developmental works. The Conventional role 
of co-operatives as thrift institutions has also been retained. These 
societies will be channelling advice and training for village cadres. Thus, 
co-operative societies become a key functional unit of the IRDP. Some 
indices of their operations are presented in Table 3-4. 
Table 3-4 
Co-operative Organizations in the N.W.F.P. 
Markazes 
( N o . ) 
Vi l lages 
( N o . ) 
Co-operat ive 
societ ies 













15* 1027 481 Rs. 849 R s . 7941 Rs . 16246** 
Source : Directorate of Rural Deve lopment . 
*Data relates to Markazes in Operation by June 1975 
**The average was computed with the number of Co-operat ive societie* 
which actually obtained credit (88) as the d e n o m i n a t e s . 
Knowing that there could have been more than one co-operative 
society in a village, 481 societies in 1027 villages suggest that less than 40 
percent of villages were organized under the IRDP. These are adequate 
but not overly impressive results of organizational efforts. 
Although members' contributions were relatively meagre (Rs. 849 
average per society), government grants and credit added to the financial 
resources of co-operative societies. Still their finances were not adequate 
to allow them to undertake a commercial or industrial venture^ .j 
4 3 
On the other hand, village co-operative societies were executing civil 
works in Markazes. This activity became the primary function of co-
operative societies. Some idea of the scale of these operations can be 
gained from Appendix Table C-l. The table shows that for the 15 Mar-
kazes in 1975-76, the average expenditure in civil works per Markaz was 
Rs. 370388. What kind of development was undertaken with these funds 
can be observed from Table 3-5. 
Table 3-5 
Works Programme 1975-1976 
Communica t ion Irrigation F l o o d Protect ion Sani tat ion 
A v . N o . Av . Cost A v . N o . Av . cos t Av . N o . Av . Cost A v . N o . A v . cost 
o f per of per of per of per 
schemes Scheme Schemes scheme Schemes Scheme Schemes Scheme 
per per per per per 
Markaz Markaz Markaz Markaz Markaz 
(Rs . ) (Rs . ) (Rs. ) (Rs . ) 
4 .2 20628 10 17294 3.8 36940 2.5 17450 
Source : Directorate o f Rural Development , N . W . F . P . 
Note: D a t a for previous years was not available. 
*In comput ing average Number of schemes per markaz, only those Markazes 
were included which had executed one or more schemes. 
Irrigation and flood control works were the most common schemes 
(Table 3-5).'4 On the average about 20 schemes of various kinds were 
underway in a Markaz in 1975-76. This suggests a fairly high—volumes 
of construction work being undertaken in a Markaz by co-operative so-
cieties. It is, therefore, logical to expect that co-operative societies would 
be mostly pre-occupied with planning and execution of civil works. 
(d) Co-ordination of Public Services 
This element of the IRDP has been operatioualized in the form of 
getting the nation building departments' representatives posted at Markaz 
centres. The programme offers some inducements to promote interdepart-
«This preponderance of Irrigation and flood central schemes is the outcome of a 
provincial pol icy to a l low only land development works and prohibit undertaking 
o f any social welfare schemes (schools , dispensaries ctc.) under the I R D P . See 
Directorate o f Rural Deve lopment , op. eft. 
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mental co-operation in this respect. At every Markaz centre, an office 
complex is proposed to be built to accommodate representatives of other 
departments. Also the provincial plan proposes an expenditure of 
Rs. 0.8 million (8 lakhs) over five years period for each Markaz to supple-
ment departmental budgets so that they may recruit additional staff to 
post at Markazes. These inducements have had positive effects. 
The seven departments for which data were available attained high 
levels of performance in posting functionaries at Markaz centres (Table 
3-6). 
Table 3-6 
Posting of Departmental Representatives at Markazes, 1975 
Department Posts Percentage 
filled 
Agriculture 60 76 .6 
Revenue 60 98.3 
Educat ion 45 100.0 
Health . . . . 75 100.0 
Animal Husbandry . . 15 93.3 
Co-operat ive 45 97.8 
Forest 43 95.6 
Source : Directorate o f Rural Deve lopment N . W . F . P . 
In quantitative terms, it indicates an adequate co-ordination of 
public functionaries; whether the qualitative effects were also as sanguine 
is not so evident. In fact there is some evidence to the contrary. 
The posting of a functionary does not mean that he works full time 
on Markaz projects. Often the Markaz assignment is an additional charge 
for a public official. It is more a matter of accommodating the Markaz 
in existing departmental jurisdictions. This is, even, recognized by the 
directorate of rural development. It explicitly states that " departmental 
functionaries will be involved in extension programmes under the rural 
development programmes and will continue to pursue their respective de-
partmental programmes " (Department of Local Government 1975, p. 13). 
The IRDP assumes that availability and accessability of public func-
tionaries at Markaz centres will bring forth supplies of public services in 
response to demands of people. This assumption is the basis for stressing 
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posting of departmental representatives at Markaz centres. But posting 
of departmental functionaries brings forth the issue of co-ordinating their 
activities. And in this respect, the experience so far has not been very 
encouraging. 
In Daudzai, the Project Manager was given authority to administra-
tively supervise the activities of departmental representatives. This one 
measure aroused so much hostility among nation building departments 
that the project itself was put jeopardy. [Sultan Shoab Khan 1975, p. 
17]. Wisened by this experience, the IRDP now expects departmental 
functionaries to follow their own programmes and just be available at 
Markaz centres to impart training to local leaders. Thus, there is no 
horizontal integration of public services at the Markaz level. At best 
they can be described to be co-existing. 
This review of the provincial programme shows that it has had a long 
gestation period. It was formally launched in June 1973, but the frame-
work of the programme was not finalized till Jan. 1975 (Musharraf 1975, 
p.l). In parenthesis it might be mentioned that a side effect of this long 
gestation period has appeared in the form of paucity of data.5 There 
have been some positive effects of proceeding cautiously in defining the 
programme. 
The N.W.F.P. programme is conceptually sound and it incorporates 
a viable strategy. How it has worked out ? This question will be pur-
sued through the case study. Generally, the methodology of the case 
study is the same as described in the previous chapter. Only the interview 
schedule had to be redesigned to reflect specific measures and emphasis 
of the N.W.F.P. programme [See Appendix-F]. 
Case Study of Battal Markaz 
Battal is a small town (pop. 5413 in 1972) in Mansehra Tehsil of Hazara 
district. It is the centre of a Markaz which includes 50 villages of four 
Union Councils. It is a mountainous region of limited agricultural po-
tential and poor industrial base. The communication network is thread-
bare. There are few pacca roads and large sections of the Markaz area 
are accessible only by mule or on foot. The famous silk route is the only 
highway going through the area. A few secondary roads branch of this 
highway leading to Daddar, Baffa, etc. 
The choice of Battal Markaz for the case study was guided by the same 
criteria which were applied in Punjab. The Markaz was established in 
April 1973 which meant that it had been operating for more than three 
years at the time of this evaluation. It was not a pilot project, rather it 
was a typical Markaz of the provincial programme. 
sDaudzai pi lot project is an exception to this observation. 
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The topography, physical resources, climate and cultural patterns 
vary widely in the NWFP. One would be hard put to find a representative 
area in the province. This is why the case study approach has been adop-
ted. We are observing the programme in operation and will be assessing 
effectiveness of the approach and organization of the programme. To the 
extent these features are invariant, our findings will be relevant to the pro-
gramme as a whole. 
The methodology employed in the case study was described in Chapter 
II. The same procedures were followed in selecting interviewees. Com-
munity informants from four villages were interviewed. The data about 
the Markaz activities were obtained from official records and office files. 
_  The four villages selected for the field work were representative of 
the"area. The mean distance of these villages from Battal was 11.3 miles 
and their average distance from the closest bazar/village was 3.4 miles. 
Two villages were located at 2-3 miles from the highway on a katcha road. 
One was about 15 miles from the highway on a ravel road and the fourth 
village was high up on the mountain accessible by foot only. 
The respondents (community informants) interviewed for this study 
were mostly from middle or upper-middle class occupations. The average 
(mode) respondent was a farmer-owner or farmer-cwwi-shop-keeper or 
professional [Appendix Table C-2]. It must be mentioned that the land 
holdings in this region were small. According to the IRDP bench mark 
surveys the average farm size was 8.2 acres. Thus the influentials in this 
region were seldom full time farmers. They comprised 35 percent of our 
respondents. 
If the socio-economic profile of the total population is used as a cri-
terion, the predominance of middle class influentials among our respon-
dents suggests a bias. A certain degree of this bias was unavoidable be-
cause influentials predominated among informed members of village com-
munities and also were dominant among office bearers of co-operative 
societies whose inclusion among interviews was necessary to obtain in-
formation about the operations of the programme. The direction of this 
bias will be favourable to the programme. The magnitude of this bias was 
not over-whelming : About 65 percent of respondents were medium 
and small farmers, non-agricultural labour and petty shopkeepers 
[Appendix Table C-3]. 
(i) Centrality: Battal has a Bazar where people from nearby villages 
have been coming to buy provisions and goods for a long time. It also 
has had a dispensary, a high school, a bank and a police post predating 
the establishment of the Markaz. The IRDP has brought a few publie 
offices and has attracted some activities to Battal. A Markaz office 
complex was under construction at the time of the field work. Through 
these measures, the Markaz expects to invest Battal with new functions 
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and make it a central place for the area. To assess the effectiveness of 




Goods and Services 
Before IRDP After IRDP 
Groceries, meat and vegeta-
bles. Village (50.0%) Village (45.0%) 
Clothes Battal (45.0%) Battal (35.0%) 
Shoes Battal (45.0%) Battal (40.0%) 







Bank Battal (45.0%) Battal (35.0%) 




Mandi Village (50.0% Village (50.0%) 
High School (Boys) Battal (60.0%) Battal (60.0%) 
Agricultural (Credit) Mansehra (45.0%) Battal (45.0%) 
Extension Services Not Re-
ported 
(35.0%) Village (35.0%) 
Village (30.0%) Battal (30.0%) 
Source : The Vi l lage Survey. 
•Percentages in parenthesis are modal responses for each item. For example, the 
most c o m m o n response to the quest ion, ' where do the people buy clothes' was 
Battal which was ment ioned by 45 .0% of the respondents. 
Table 3-7 shows that the IRDP has not affected the pattern of 
central places of the area in any significant way. People seemed to be 
going to, more or less, the same places to obtain various goods and services 
after the establishment of the Markaz as before this event. Two mild 
trends are detectable in the pattern of obtaining agricultural supplies. 
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There is a shift from Mansehra to Battal for obtaining agricultural credit. 
The modal response (45 percent) reflects that Battal had emerged as the 
centre for this service after the IRDP. 
At the same time, fertilizer, seed and extension services were seem-
ingly becoming available directly in villages. This is an understandable 
decentralizing trend. Agricultural inputs, in general, are being delivered 
at farmer's door steps by various public and private agencies. Proliferation 
of seed and fertilizer depots and farm side agricultural loan programmes 
are some of the obvious secular trends in this direction. If the Markaz 
has contributed to this trend, its share is almost indistinguishable from 
other public activities. 
Battal has not emerged, so far, as the hub of the Markaz area. The 
significant central functions acquired by it, recently, were Markaz off ces. 
In reply to a question about the role of Battal before and after the IP DP, 
the respondents indicated that Markaz offices were the only new functions 
added to Battal [Appendix Table C-4], 
(ii) Integration o] Public Services: This element of the programme 
is articulated in the policy of getting representatives of the nation building 
departments posted at Markazes. At Battal, six departments (Revenue, 
Agriculture, Education, Animal Husbandry, Co-operatives and Health) 
had posted low-level functionaries since the middle of 1973. Quantita-
tively, it is 66 percent fulfilment of the target (nine departments) in 
postings. But posting is only a necessity and not a sufficient condition 
to bring about the integration of services. What did the six posted 
representatives contribute to the Markaz programme? This question 
deserves to be investigated. 
A variety of evidence suggests that these representatives pursued their 
respective departmental programmes and did little to effect a co-ordinated 
delivery of public services. 
The Markaz staff was vocally dissatisfied with the present arrange-
ments. In the absence of some authority vested in the project manager 
to co-ordinate the activities of departmental functionaries, the Markaz 
staff felt that they were not receiving any significant assistance from 
these officials. There had been few interdepartmental meetings and 
Markaz officials knew very little about the activities of the other public 
functionaries. Furthermore, the posted representatives were merely 
relocated from other jurisdictions. Their work assignments and pro-
gramme priorities remained almost unaltered. They followed their de-
partmental programmes and paid little heed to the Markaz programme. 
It also needs to be pointed out that the representatives of nation 
building departments were low-level functionaries with limited powers and 
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competence. Dispensers or veterinary assistants could not be expected 
to plan and execute developmental decisions at their own initiative. 
To find out the impact of the presence of these functionaries on the 
supply of public services, pertinent questions were asked respondents. 
Responses to probings about changes experienced by people in the supply 
of various goods and services are presented in Table 3-8. 
Table 3-8 
Improvements in Availability of Goods and Services 
Goods and Services 
Yes No 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Seeds 6 30.0 14 70.0 
Fertilizer 12 60.0 8 40.0 
Agricultural Advice 14 70.0 6 30.0 
Drinking water 1 5.0 19 95.0 
Agricultural Credit 13 65.0 7 35.0 
Livestock Care 5 25.0 15 75.0 
Irrigation water 7 35.0 13 65.0 
Medical Clinic 4 20.0 16 80.0 
Bank 14 70.0 6 30.0 
Co-operative Society 18 90.0 2 10.0 
Source: The Vil lage Survey. 
The table shows that people had not experienced any marked im-
provements in the availability of medical, drinking water or educational 
facilities. This observation further validates the impression that posting 
of dipartmental functionaries was not yielding the desired effect of im-
proving the supply of their respective services. The availability of ferti-
lizer, agricultural advice and credit were felt to have improved noticeably 
(Table 3-8). These were many interacting factors contributing to this 
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situation. But these improvements were not attributable to the efforts 
of the functionaries of the nation building departments per se. 
(iii) Simultaneous Delivery of Agricultural Inputs: This element of 
the Markaz concept is essentially an application of the notion of 
"integration" specially to the agriculture sector. It assumes that consciously 
planned efforts will be made to regulate the delivery of agricultural inputs. 
In Battal, there was little evidence of such a plan. 
There were some segmental attempts to improve agricultural services. 
Field assistants were posted in four union councils, village co-operative 
societies nominated model farmers, credit and fertilizers became readily 
available with the opening of depots and banks in the Markaz area. 
There were independently occurring events which coincided temporarily. 
Their coincidence had a positive effect on agricultural production; at 
least respo dents felt that way. 
The respondents felt that per acre yield of Maize, the primary crop 
of the area, had substantially increased (Table 3-9). In explaining the 
reasons, respondents singled out the increased supply of fertilizer as the 
main factor for these improvements. They recognized the role of better 
seed in raising the yield, but expressed dissatisfactions about its supply. 
Table 3-9 
Changes in the Yield of Maize 
Changes Number Percentage 
No increase 2 10.0 
Increase of less than 25 percent 1 5.0 
Increase of 25-100% 15 75.0 
More than 100% increase 2 10.0 
Total : 20 100.0 
Source: The Vil lage Survey. 
Battal is a hilly area whose agriculture is rain fed and labour intensive. 
Farm holdings are small (8.2 acres on the average). Here agricultural 
development would depend on crop planning, application of fertilizer, 
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insecticides, use of better seed and introduction of better farming prac-
tices. Markaz did not develop a plan or strategy to provide these inputs 
in a systematic way. Respondents also confirmed this observation by 
indicating unawareness of any Markaz sponsored agricultural develop-
ment efforts. Even village model farmers were regarded more as office 
bearers of co-operative societies than progressive agriculturists who could 
demonstrate innovative practices. Agricultural improvements were 
coincidental to the Markaz and not 'caused' by it. 
(iv) Organization and Mobilization of People : The function of 
organizing and mobilizing people is assigned to co-operative societiej 
in the IROP. They have been conceived as surrogates of local councils in 
the absence of representative local government. Co-operative societies 
are expected to articulate community needs, to mobilize local resources 
(savings) and to plan and execute village developmental projects. Appa-
rently, other roles of co-operative societies have been overshadowed by 
one activity to plan and build minor civil works. 
In Battal Markaz, there were almost as many co-operative societies 
as villages. These societies could mobilize very small amounts of savings 
from their members—average share capital per society was Rs. 467 
(Table 3-10). Even with public loans, the average assets of a co-opera-
tive society were about Rs. 8,000. This is a small amount to undertake 
any significant project. 
Table 3-10 
Co-operative Societies in Baital 
Co-operative Members Average Average Average 
Societies per Share Capital loan outstanding 
Society per Society* advanced loan per 
per Society** Society 
( N o . ) ( N o . ) (Rs. ) (Rs. ) (Rs. ) 
50 32 467 7609 7347 
Source : The I R D P office, Batlal 
Note : "Average based on data for 23 societies . 
""Average based o n data for 25 societ ies . 
On the other hand these societies were spending Rs. 10,000 to 20,000 
per year on public works under the Markaz programme. The contrasts 
between the meagre resources available for credit and enterprise and re-
latively abundant opportunities to make use of public funds for civil 
works partially explains the basis for the dominance of the latter function 
This fact is further borne out by the respondents. 
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There was great fervour to form co-operative societies in villages. 
Although there were already 50 co-operative societies in the Markaz, new 
ones were still being formed and seeking recognition from the Markaz 
staff.6 
The visage survey revealed that activities of Co-operative Societies 
were also widely known. About 75 percent of respondents knew about 
the frequency of meetings of their respective village societies [Appendix 
Table C-5]. Obviously, there was wide spread awareness about the bene-
fits of forming co-operative societies. 
To get an idea of what were these perceived benefits, respondents 
were asked to indicate the significant decisions made by their village 
co-operative societies. 
Table 3-11 
Decisions of Co-operative Society 
Decision* Number Percentage 
Public works/Schemes 14 70.0 
Advice/training 3 15.0 
No response 3 15.0 
Tota l : 20 100.0 
Source : The Village Survey. 
*Only one respondent had mentioned mult iple decis ions. H i s first mentioned 
response was taken into account. 
The co-operative society meant, primarily, the execution of works or 
what respondents called " schemes " . Seventy percent of respondents 
cited schemes as the significant contributions of their village societies. 
Similar identification of co-operative societies with public works is evident 
from responses to the question about their accomplishments. Appendix 
Table C-6 indicates that respondents could recall only the construction of 
civil works (roads, irrigation channels) as the accomplishments of their 
societies. The only other response was an occasional mention of training 
as an activity. 
From the above analysis, a pattern can be discerned. It seems that 
co-operative societies were more popular as an instrument of obtaining 
6During one week's period of our field work, two groups approached us to seek 
help in getting registered by the Markaz. In one case, a petition describing elaborately 
the ceremonies performed to inaugurate the co-operative group and bearing fifteen 
signatures was produced over night. 
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public funds for local civil works. The collective as well as individual 
benefits associated with such undertakings captured people's imaginations. 
The Markaz staff had to promote the first few co-operative societies; 
thereafter they multiplied with the momentum of the perceived benefits. 
(v) Social Awareness and Local Leadership : Apparently the Markaz 
programme was widely known. This awareness of the programme is a 
reflection of people's consciousness about their rights and opportunities. 
Thus the apathy that one encounters in villages is not entirely the result 
of peoples' unawareness. The absence of purposive action is equally 
responsible for the rural blight. The IRDP established a framework to 
initiate actions and to foster leadership. This function is also assigned 
to co-operative societies. 
The leaders of co-operative societies are expected to educate people 
and act as the liaison between the public officials and the masses. In 
turn, they are trained by public functionaries and for this purpose formal 
arrangements of holding training sessions at Markaz centres have been 
institutionalized. 
In Battal, village cadres consisted of Presidents, Manager and Model 
farmers of village Co-operative Societies. Eight training sessions were 
held in 1975-76 wherein Markaz staff gave lectures.7 
According to the office records, these sessions were attended by 51 
model farmers and 56 managers and Presidents. The fact that these 
leaders were getting training was widely known. Eighty percent of the 
respondents of the village survey knew about the training programme of 
the Markaz (Table 3-12). 
Table 3-12 
Knowledge about Leader's Training 
Training Number Percentage 
Yes 16 80.0 
No 4 20.0 
Total: 20 100.0 
Source: The Vil lage Survey. 
'Each person attending a training session was el igible to receive Rs . 8 as honour-
arium. 
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Similarly about 85 percent of respondents either knew about or were 
informed of the activities of Markaz officials [Appendix Table C-7]. 
These observations dispell the common stereotype that villagers are 
ignorant and uninformed about the possibilities around them. Obviously 
it was not awareness that needed to be aroused. The challenge was to 
deepen and channelize this awareness. This brings us to the question 
of whether the leaders were sharing (with people) the information im-
parted to them at the Markaz centre. 
Table 3-13 reflects an unenthusiastic response to the above question. 
Only 35 percent of respondents observed that co-operative leaders formally 
inform and advise people. 
Table 3-13 
Leader's Role in Disseminating Information 
Role Number Percentage 
Do not hold meetings and inform people 6 30.0 
Hold meetings and inform people 7 35.0 
Do not know/No response 7 35.0 
Total : 20 100.0 
Source: T h e Vil lage Survey. 
It must be noted that formalized training is an unprecedent practice 
in Pakistan's history of rural development. Often a leader's role implies 
a prestigeous position enabling one to command other's loyalties and 
obedience. In Battal, a conflict between the old and the new conceptions 
of the leader's role was evident. Co-operative society leaders had not 
assumed the educator's role in earnest, but they were also not, yet, suc-
ceeding in establishing their hegemony over people. The pervasive aware-
ness about the beneficial features, such as schemes, of the Markaz pro-
gramme was a check on the leader's ambitions and command. 
A visible change of leadership pattern was evident. The Markaz 
programme had brought forth a new breed of leaders. We will, later, 
examine their socio-economic characteristics. Presently we might note the 
changes that had occurred. 
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Table 3-14 shows that respondents had divided opinions about this 
question. Fifty-five percent thought that the traditional village elders 
were continuing to run village affairs, whereas 40 percent felt that the 
leadership was passing into the hands of co-operative society office bearers. 
Obviously the resources placed at the disposal of co-operative society 
leaders were giving them some leverage in village affairs. This change 
was not without rancour and factional conflicts. We have little evidence 
to throw light on the performance of the new leaders and to make judge-
ment about the effects of these Markaz induced changes. Our impres-
sion is that the change is in line with the overall trend in Pakistan. The 
power and influence is passing into the hands of bourgeosie and the hold 
of the aristocracy and feudal lords is declining. From the rural develop-
ment perspective, the new leadership does not promise to be any move 
altruistically inspired then the old establishment. 
Table 3-14 
Change in Leadership Patterns 
Change Number Percentage 
No significant change 11 55.0 
From old elite to co-operative society leaders 8 40.0 
No response 1 5.0 
Total: 20 100.0 
Source : T h e Vi l lage Survey. 
(vi) Improving Living Conditions Through Infrastructural Development: 
For people of Battal, the terms Markaz, Co-operative Society and deve-
lopment schemes were synonymous. The infrastructural development 
project were pre-eminent in the Markaz programme. 
Table 3-15 
Budget Allocations, Battal 
Year Establishment Contingencies* Total 


















Source : Project Manager , Battal . 
•Cont ingencies include a l loca t ions for infrastructural deve lopment and co -ope -
rative credit . 
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By the second year of the programme, contingencies were being allo-
cated 80-90% of Markaz budget. Civil works consumed 50-60% of the 
contingency allocation. The scale of infrastructural development work can 
be gauged from the fact that in the two quarters of 1975-76, about 3.5 
lakh rupees were spent on such schemes. Furthermore, 37 other schemes 
were being financed, under the world Food Programme. Thus, about 50 
civil works of one or the other kind were underway in Battal in 1975-76. 
The average expenditure per scheme under the IRDP budget was 
Rs. 27050.8 This also explains, partially, the fervour with which co-operative 
societies were being organized in Battal. These schemes are implemented 
by a committee chosen by a co-operative society. It is, therefore, inesca-
pable that many persons would be allured to co-operative societies by 
possibilities of personal gains. 
To find out what people knew about the infrastructural development 
activities of the Markaz, respondents were asked to indicate the nature of 
facilities built under Markaz schemes. 
Almost all respondents could mention one or more facilities under 
construction in and around their villages. Roads were more frequently 
mentioned—55 percent of respondents indicated that roads were being 
constructed in their areas. The provincial policy of prohibiting cons-
truction of social welfare schemes is also evident by the absence of schools, 
street paving and similar works from the Table 3-16. In contrast to the 
Table 3-16 
Facilities Built by Markaz 
Yes N o 
Faci l i t ies 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
R o a d s 11 55.0 9 45 .0 
Drainage , Irrigation 7 35.0 13 65.0 
Btmds, flood control dams . . 4 20.0 16 80 .0 
Culverts, bridges 4 20.0 16 80.0 
Drinking water 1 5.0 19 95 .0 
Source : T h e Village Survey. 
provincial policy, respondents thought that the foremost felt need of their 
villages was the supply of drinking water [Appendix Table C-8]. This 
shows up an inconsistency in the programme. On the one hand, people's 
participation in decision making is stressed and on the other official poli-
cies pre-empt the scope of such decisions. 
sThis average is based on the expenditure data for 14 schemes . 
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Another aspect of the infrastructural development programme must 
be pointed out. The responsibility for planning and designing about 50 
schemes of varying types fell on one man—the Markaz engineer. No 
matter how competent a person may be, it is unlikely that one person can 
adequately look after such a volume and variety of engineering works. 
This is liable to result in poor designs which if further compromised in con-
struction are likely to result in shoddy and unreliable work. In Battal, this 
was already beginning to be evident. Unfinished roads which were crum-
bling, culverts that had been washed away and bunds which remained 
incomplete were to be commonly heard about. The infrastructural deve-
lopment in Battal was proceeding without an overall plan. It was essen-
tially a conglomeration of individual schemes. And one could not be 
very sanguine about the maintenance of what was being built. Co-operative 
societies had limited resources and out of these, they were expected to 
bear maintenance costs. The developmental activity in Battal bears 
many resemblances to the erstwhile Rural Works Programme. 
(vii) Target Population and Beneficiaries: The IRDP is meant to 
serve the welfare of medium and small farmers and agricultural labour. 
From the nature of Markaz activities, it can be deduced who were primary 
beneficiaries. First, we will present the respondents' impressions. 
Table 3-17 indicates that respondents felt that the benefits of the 
IRDP were widely spread. The modal response (55 percent) was that 
Table 3-17 
Beneficiaries of the IRDP 
Beneficiaries Number Percentage 
Big land lords only 1 5.0 
Medium and small farmers only 3 15.0 
Labour only 2 10.0 
Everybody 11 55.0 
None 3 15.0 
Total: 20 100.0 
Source: The Vi l lage Survey. 
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everybody had benefitted from the IRDP. These responses must be in-
terpreted in the context of the situation in Battal. There the term IRDP 
meant developmental schemes and those were considered beneficial by 
everybody. Village communities hoped to obtain certain facilities, the 
poor could expect temporary employment, leaders could hope to exer-
cise power as well as disburse funds. Thus, it is valid to expect that 
everybody would benefit, to some degree, from the IRDP. The existence 
of these expectations was confirmed by other data. 
Table 3-18 
Living Conditions oj the Poor 













Source: T h e Vi l lage Survey. 
In response to the question about the changes in the living condi-
tions of the poor, the respondents overwhelmingly (80 percent) indicated 
that those have improved during the last few years. The reason given 
for those improvements referred to general awareness of rights, increased 
job opportunities-including those in Markaz schemes—and outmigration 
of labour. Most of these factors were merely coincidental with the 
Markaz programme. The Markaz has hightened expectations of benefits 
by generating some short term developmental activity. 
The leaders of co-operative societies constituted a group that directly 
benefitted from the Markaz programme. We have already observed that 
they constituted the emerging middle level rural leadership. This group is 
comprised of persons with unusual characteristics for a rural area. Data 
about occupations, education and land holding of co-operative society 
presidents and Managers were collected through the Markaz office. 
Table 3-19 presents an occupational distribution of village leaders. 
Large proportion (almost 75 percent) of co-operative societies, lea-
ders were men of two worlds : their ancesteral roots were in villages and 
in farming and their personal stakes were in towns in the form of jobs, 
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shops and contacts: They were sofad posh which could be described 
as rural bourgeoisie. By social status, a majority (46 percent) belonged 
to the class of village influentials [Appendix Table C-9]. One way 
to maintain influence in a village is to have access to public officials. 
Thus, it seems that a symbiotic relationship had emerged between the 
Markaz officials and leaders of co-operative societies. The leaders needed 
the schemes to expand their power base and the officials needed their sup-
port to get some projects underway. This mutual dependence is likely to 
lead to an appropriation of the programme benefits by the leaders and 
other members of the sofad posh class. 
Table 3-19 
Occupations of Presidents and Managers of Co-operative Societies 
Occupations Number Percentage 
Shopkeepers/farmer owners professionals 34 45.9 
Medium farmers owners/ex-serviceman, 
Imams. 
22 29.7 
Small farmers, tenants 18 24.4 
Source : Markaz office, Battal . 
Summary of Findings 
Preceding sections of this chapter present a number of observations 
about the workings of the IRDP in the frontier province. These obser-
vations have been derived from the provincial data as well as the case 
study of a Markaz. From these observations some generalized findings 
and conclusions can be abstracted which, in the strict methodological 
sense, should only be attributed to Battal Markaz. On the other hand, 
(he case study is also meant to suggest some general tendencies which 
might serve as hypotheses for further investigation. With this purpose 
in view, we present below a resume of the main findings of this chapter. 
(a) The frontier province's IRDP has been modelled after the Daud-
zai pilot project. It employ the strategy of aided and guided 
local initiative. There are three main planks of this strategy; 
namely : 
(i) assembling public functionaries at the Markaz centre and, 
thus, making their services readily available to the people; 
(ii) Organizing village co-operative societies to act as local 
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groups for planning and building physical infrastructure 
with public grants and to serve the credit demands o f villa-
gers; 
(iii) promoting local leadership through training and demonstra-
tion. The functionaries are meant to be advisers, trainers, 
mobilizers and expeditors. They are noi initiators and 
executors of developmental proposals. Village co-operative 
societies are supposed to be the prime movers of the IRDP. 
This is a unique strategy in the sense that public resources 
have been put at the disposal of an ad-hoc local group, i.e. 
a co-operative society. 
The programme was slow to take off and it had a relatively long 
gestation period. The provincial government observed the pro-
gress of Daudzai project before fully embracing the approach. 
But there are some inexplicable indications of the lagging com-
mitment to the IRDP. Within a year of formulizing the pro-
gramme (Jan. 1975), the provincial budgets for the IRDP was 
reduced. 
The effectiveness of the IRDP depends upon the proper func-
tioning of co-operative societies in various roles. As for as the 
formation of co-operative societies is concerned, people have 
responded with enthusiasm. Once the programme became known, 
little effort had to be invested to organize co-operative societies. 
What has caught people's attention is the possibility of obtaining 
public grants to undertake civil works. This function has 
overshadowed all other objectives of co-operative societies. They 
have mobilized very limited local resources. As a source of credit 
they have remained minor contributors. As channels of dissemi-
nating nesv ideas, co-operative societies have not, even, made any 
notable efforts. 
The building of physical infrastructure as an activity has captured 
the Markaz programme. This is the most widely known acti-
vity of the Markaz and there is visible fervour among villagers 
to organize themselves into co-operative societies so that they 
may be eligible to undertake schemes. These schemes are being 
undertaken without any comprehensive area plan or sense of 
priorities. Even the technical design and supervision are likely 
to be, understandably, inadequate because a large number of un-
related projects are being planned by one engineer. This fact 
alone raises some doubts about the quality of work. Given the 
tradition of expecting personal gains from public works, it will 
not be surprising if all this construction activity does not turn 
out to be another Rural Work Programme. 
The objective of integrating public services is being realized if 
measured in terms of public functionaries posted at Markazes. 
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But if the criterion of co-ordinated public effort is applied to the 
results of these postings, then the Markaz has not succeeded in 
providing a cohesive framework of public services. Low-level 
public functionaries posted at Markazes continue, by and large, 
to operate independently following their departmental program-
mes and attending to their usual duties. They lack necessary 
competence, authority and responsiveness that are required to 
tackle local developmental tasks. 
( / ) Markazes have done little to formulate area wide plans and tap 
local resources. The activities are undertaken in isolation from 
each other and without any comprehensive strategy of physical 
or resource development. Similarly concerted efforts to raise 
agricultural production, an objective of the IRDP, require some 
planning. This is also missing from Markaz is programme of 
action. The programme relies on model farmers and co-opera-
tive societies as the initiators of agricultural improvements. 
Their performance does not match their responsibilities. What-
ever improvements have been registered by the agricultural sector 
were coincidental to the IRDP. 
(g) The Markaz in the N.W.F.P. seems to be evoking enthusiasm 
among villagers. The people are aware of possibilities offered 
by Markaz which they interpret to be building of civil works—or 
schemes as locally known. Apart from the wide spread aware-
ness of the programme they are equally widely shared expec-
tations of obtaining gains from these schemes. The labour 
expects short term employment, the community hopes to get a 
road built or well sunk, the leaders expect to exercise power and 
disburse public funds. The Markaz programme has brought out 
a special class of persons as local leaders. They are semi-com-
mercialized and urbanized members of the rural middle class 
whose felicity in dealing with public officials has proven to be 
an asset. They form a circle around developmental programmes 
and successfully re-orient those to their advantage. Whether 
the same will happen to the IRDP remains to be seen, but all 




The Integrated Rural Development Programme is an expression of 
the public commitment to bring rural communities into the mainstream 
of modern life by improving their productive capabilities and by expand-
ing their health, education and infrastructural facilities. This programme 
follows a series of public efforts, such as V-AID, Rural Works, etc., 
addressed to the development of rural areas. The fact that each in-
effective programme in time leads to the formulation of a new one indi-
cates the depth of need and the Intensity of public commitment to pro-
mote rural development. The IRDP is the most recent of such public 
efforts. 
There is a consensus about the broad goals of rural development: 
that is, to raise production and incomes and to improve living conditions. 
Similarly the sense of urgency about these goals is widely shared. It is 
the question of how to realize these goals that divides opinions and leads 
to different approaches. The IRDP incorporates the most recent and 
internationally popular notions about rural development. 
It is based on a demand and supply model of public services. Rural 
communities as consumers are encouraged to organize themselves in co-
operative groups to demand and receive a co-ordinated set of public 
services supplied by government departments. The Rural Development 
Department is supposed to facilitate and mobilize the supply of the 
required services. This model assumes that simultaneous increase of 
material and service inputs in rural production processes will jolt them 
out of low-level equilibriums and set them on the path of economic deve-
lopment and social change. Implicit in this assumption is faith in the 
relevance and effectiveness of public services. What if government depart-
ments do not offer adequate services or may be inefficient or corrupt! 
Such common occurrences have not been taken into account in concep-
tualizing the Integrated Rural Development approach, even at a theoretical 
plane. Pakistan's IRDP also suffers from this conceptual lapse and 
ignores lessons of the earlier programmes in this respect. 
The IRDP in Pakistan has been in operation since July, 1972. 
Although it is too young to register substantive gains on indicators of 
rural incomes and welfare, yet it is old enough to be submitted to a 
'concurrent evaluation' for assessing the validity of its approach and 
assumptions. This study carried out such an evaluation. It has assessed 
the effectiveness of the Markaz as an operational unit of the programme 
through field studies of two Markazes: one in Punjab and the other in 
N.W.F.P. This evaluation is meant to assess the viability of markaz 
operations and to determine the impact of the programme on income and 
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welfare of communities in the Markaz areas. The two broad questions 
to which this study is addressed are: 
(/) Is the Markaz fulfilling the programme objectives ? 
(ii) How do Markaz programmes affect people of the area ? 
As a concurrent evaluation, this study should help to identify strengths 
and weaknesses of the programme. 
Formulation of the approach and methodology of this study presen-
ted a number of problems. The IRDP lacks an authoritative statement 
of objectives. Numerous and slightly varying versions of the objectives 
were not the only handicaps. There is a certain degree of vagueness 
and injudicious mixing of 'means' and 'ends' in these statements. These 
limitations not only make difficult the task of an evaluator but also 
may have introduced dissipative tendencies in the programme. The latter 
is evident from Markaz progress reports. Almost every public or private 
developmental activity occurring in Markaz areas is being claimed to the 
credit of the IRDP without any regard to the actual contribution of the 
programme. This practice may appear to be an innocuous public relations 
device to project an enlarged image of the accomplishments of the pro-
gramme but in fact it is a symptom of the vagueness of the programme.' 
We have dwelt on this practice to point out problems faced in formulating 
criteria for evaluation. This problem was solved by deducing a set of 
instrumental objectives of the programme from various statements and 
abstracting seven dimensions along which the performance of the pro-
gramme could be measured. These abstracted objectives and dimensions 
constitute the conceptual framework of this study. 
To observe the operations of the programme first hand, it was decided 
to develop in-depth case studies of two Markazes—one each in Punjab 
and the N.W.F.P. Manawala (Punjab) and Battal (N.W.F.P.) were the 
oldest Markazes in their respective provinces, other than Daudzai and 
Shadab pilot projects. The latter were purposely excluded from this 
study. We wanted to study Markazes which were representatives of 
the programme in matters of resources and administrative attention. 
Obviously pilot projects receive special treatment on both these counts. 
The findings of these case studies combined with the analysis of 
programme data obtained from provincial directorates provide a reason-
able basis to arrive at tentative judgements about the effectiveness of the 
programme. In the strict methodological sense, our conclusions are 
'The difficulties arising from this vagueness or 'lack of consensus' have also been 
observed by Wanasinghe, a U . N . advisor. See H. S. Wanasinghe, "Report o f an 
Advisory Miss ion . . . "United Nat ions , ESCAP, p p . 6-7. (Mimeographed) . 
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valid for the two Markazes studied in this evaluation. Yet to the degree 
they were representatives of respective provincial prog' amities, our find-
ings are generalizable. In the following discussion of the findings, we 
have attempted to maintain a stance that conclusions are valid for Mana-
wala and Battal, except wherever corroborative provincial data extend 
the scope of these conclusions. They should be read with this qualification 
in mind. The significance of our case studies lies in suggesting hypotheses 
and providing empirical insights for further investigation or re-examina-
tion of programme assumptions on the part of policy makers. 
The main findings of the two case studies are presented in Table 4-1. 
These have been abstracted from concluding sections of Chapters Hand III. 
Among the seven dimensions on which the programme has been evaluated, 
only two reflect a noticeable impact of the programme. One aspect in which 
tlie IRDP shows a certain degree of achievement is the initial success in 
prompting the formation of village co-operative societies. This success 
was observable in both Markazes. It signifies a general willingness of rural 
communities to associate with any public developmental effort. This 
conclusion is further supported by the finding that there was a high degree 
of general awareness among populations of the two Markaz areas. Per-
haps it is, now, a pervasive condition in much of the rural sector of Pakistan. 
Table 4-1 also shows that in Battal, civil works were the most common 
and visible feature of the IRDP and in Manawala, agricultural extension 
constituted the main thrust of the programme. These are the main succes-
ses of the programme. On most of the other dimensions, our case studies 
revealed that the programme was having little impact. As an overall 
conclusion, it can be said that in Manawala the IRDP had turned into a 
supplemental, not primary, agricultural input supply programme and in 
Battal (N.W.F.P.) it had become a local PWD. It was observed that the 
programme had not, at least yet, realized a promised, multisectoral and 
integrated approach. What specific contribution has it made towards 
various objectives? This question will be answered in the following 
sections. 
(a) The IRDP and Agricultural Development 
To increase agricultural yields and improve methods of production 
is a primary objective of the IRDP. A number of instrumental objec-
tives have also been set up to promote this objective; for example, supply 
of seed, fertilizer, credit, mechanization of agriculture, etc. Under the 
IRDP, the key to the realization of these instrumental objectives is the 
'posting' of appropriate public functionaries at Markaz centres and 
through them, hopefully, making available necessary public inputs. 
The results of this strategy, as observed in two Markazes, are not very 
reassuring. There are two steps involved in this process and shortfalls 
could be observed at each. First, the programme elicited a relatively 
poor response from Nation Building Departments in terms of postings 
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Table 4-1 
Summary of Findings from Case Studies 
Programme Dimension 
Centrality 
Integration of Publ ic Services 
Simultaneous Delivery o f 
Agricultural Inputs 
Manawala (Punjab) 
N o significant Change in 
Manawala town's role 
except for the locat ion of 
Markaz offices. 
N o t many departmental 
representatives posted at 
the Markaz. 
Markaz supplementing 
market channels for the 
supply o f seed and ferti-
lizer. Many essential 




N o significant change in 
Battal village role except 




to Markaz. N o signifi-
cant change in availabi-
lity o f services. 
Litt le visible effort to 
deliver agricultural in-
puts. Farm planning 
non-exis tence . 
Organization and M o b i l i z a -
tion o f People 
People's Awareness and Loca l 
Leadership 
Target Population and Bene-
ficiaries 
Initial success in setting 
up or adopting existing 
co-operat ive soc ie t ies . 
Litt le fo l low-up and 
petering out of enthu-
siasm. 
Fairly high level o f 
general awareness about 
rights and needs. T h e 
I R D P is only a coinci -
dental factor i n the 
emergence of this feeling. 
Improving Living Condit ions— 
Infrastructural Deve lopment 
N o civil works under-
taken on behalf o f Mar-
kaz. Health, education, 
welfare services expand-
ing generally and incre-
mentally. The I R D P has 
not given any special 
st imulus to these efforts. 
Farmers in general are 
beneficiaries, though mid-
dle class and influential 
persons benefitting more 
directly. 
Co-operat ive soc ie t ies 
very popular and more 
being demanded. These 
are ad-hoc groups main-
ly interested in obtaining 
public funds for civil 
works. 
High level of awareness . 
Considerable interest in 
Markaz civil works . 
M o s t o f the co-operat ive 
societ ies ' leaders belong 
to the rural bourgeoisie. 
Generally they are small 
shopkeepers-ewm-farmers 
with some educat ion 
and considerable influ-
ence. 
N u m e r o u s schemes o f 
building vil lage roads, 
field terracing and water 
supply under w a y . 
Heal th , education and 
welfare services not much 
affected by the I R D P . 
N o overall p lan for civi l 
works . 
Possibil i t ies of general 
publ ic benefitting from 
some civil works. More 
direct benefits for leaders 
o f co-operative societies. 
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of their functionaries at Markazes. The response was poorer in Punjab 
than in the N.W.F.P. There was a predominance of new and expanding 
departments (such as Social Welfare, Family Planning, Education, etc.) 
among those which posted representatives at Markazes. Entrenched 
and powerful bureaucracies (such as Departments of Revenue, Irrigation, 
Health) were unresponsive to the demands of the IRDP. Second, the 
posted functionaries were, often, low-level subordinates who lacked re-
sources, authority and skills to undertake developmental works They 
made little impact on Markaz areas and even their presence at Markaz 
centres was not known to large proportions of area populations. This 
is an indication of their ineffectiveness. 
The remoteness of public services is not the primary cause of their 
non-availability to rural areas. It is generally known that paucity of re-
sources, poor organization, outmoded attitudes and, many times, cor-
ruption have been the main impediments in the supply of public services. 
The two Markaz studies further confirmed this observation. Thus the 
mechanism through which the IRDP is hoping to increase agricultural 
production is ill conceived. It ignores the realities of current administra-
tive practices. 
Our Markaz surveys indicate that the agricultural yields have been 
increasing for the past five or six years. A certain momentum of change 
in the agricultural sector has been attained with the introduction of new 
varieties of seeds and fertilizers. This trend predates IRDP and has not 
been given another impetus by the programme. Numerous public cor-
porations and commercial establishments are selling seeds, fertilizers, and 
offering facilities for agricultural credit. The supply of conventional 
agricultural inputs has been increasing without the intervention of the 
IRDP. It is, thus, supplementing other channels of supply. And in many 
ways, it is a redundant effort. 
On the other hand, there are agricultural needs which are equally 
important but have remained unattended. A case in point is the problem 
of irrigation water in Manawala. The unreliability of the SCARP tube-
well water supply was mentioned many times as a basic obstacle in in-
creasing agicultural yields, but the Markaz had done little to alleviate 
the situation. It suggests that the IRDP's agricultural improvement pro-
gramme consists of a 'package' of services which are made available 
irrespective of their relevance and demand. 
To sum up our conclusion of this section, it may be said that agricul-
tural production processes are undergoing changes under the influence 
of farmers' initiative and variety of public and private channels of supply. 
The IRDP has not made any notable contribution to this trend, it has 
coasted along with it. 
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(b) Farm Planning and Incomes, Non-Agricultural Job Opportunities 
To promote farm planning for the introduction of modern agricul-
tural practices and thereby increase production and incomes is a stated 
objective of the IRDP. Complementing this is the objective of expand-
ing job opportunities in non-agricultural sectors. These objectives are 
meant to be realized through systematic local planning. The two case 
studies indicate that local planning was a neglected function in the IRDP. 
Both in Manawala and Battal, the IRDP was a 'packaged' program-
me dispensing materials and services conceived by respective provincial 
directorates. In Manawala, distribution of seeds, fertilizer, agricultural 
credit and advice were the primary activities of the programme. In 
Battal, the IRDP became, predominantly, a construction agency for civil 
works with public funds. There was no systematic assessment of local 
needs and little was done to formulate area-wide strategies of development. 
Area-wide planning in any form, agricultural or infrastructural, was absent 
in both Markazes. Thus the IRDP remains a set of sporadic and con-
tingent activities. A road here or a culvert there do not add up to a cohe-
rent and integrated development programme. Similarly seeds and ferti-
lizers without water or crop planning remain isolated sectoral efforts. 
Without guidance and discipline of local plans, the two Markazes 
could not initiate new productive activities which might have increased 
job opportunities. Nor was any systematic line of action devised to change 
farming practices. It must be mentioned that rural economies of the two 
Markazes were being diversified, weakly though, through secular forces 
of commercialization, public investment, etc. For example, in Mana-
wala, a vigorous carpet weaving cottage industry has emerged sponta-
neously. The point being stressed here is that the IRDP did not take any 
systematic measures to reinforce and accelerate these secular trends. 
The co-ordinative role of Markazes remained an administrative night-
mare. Even in the period from 1972 to 76, the relationships between 
the Rural Development Department and the Nation Building Depart-
ments were redefined many times. The pendulum has swung from a 
'supervisory-co-ordinative' role given to the IRDP officials to a state 
of co-existence of the IRDP and other departments at Markazes. The 
former situation is not tolerable to the entrenched and powerful depart-
ments and the latter arrangement fails to bring about the necessary integ-
ration of public services. An objective and participatory local plan could 
have offered another instrument of co-ordination, but this possibility has 
been overlooked. 
(c) Infrastructural Development and Improving Living Conditions 
Apart from low incomes, rural poverty is also manifested in the inade-
quacy of community facilities and services, such as water supply, hospltais, 
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schools, roads, etc. The process of rural development must simultan-
eously increase the levels of income and community facilities. The IRDP 
seek improvements in both these sectors in compliance with the cur-
rently accepted physical doctrine of the development theory.2 
The programme incorporates two measures to make public facilities 
and services available in Markaz areas. For physical infrastructure, such 
as village roads, water supply, flood dams, etc., the IRDP proposes to under-
take developmental works, directly or with the assistance of the People's 
Works Programme. The soft services, such as health, education, social 
welfare, etc., are to be made available by bringing representatives of res-
pective government departments to Markaz centres. We have earlier tou-
ched upon the effectiveness of the two measures. Presently we will dis-
cuss our findings about these efforts. 
In Punjab, a markaz has neither financial nor technical resources to 
undertake physical development projects. A Markaz submits proposals 
for the required projects to the District People's Work Councils for approval 
and execution. Thus, it is merely a need assessing agency. To accom-
plish this task systematically a Markaz should initiate surveys of local needs 
and resources, obtain people's participation to assess priorities and pre-
pare a comprehensive area-wide plan of civil works and perform feasibi-
lity studies of individual projects. This is essentially a planning function 
and, as discussed earlier, it was given low priority in formulation of the 
IRDP. 
Manawala Markaz proposals sent to the District Council, consisted of 
a list of proposed schemes without any intimation of priorities and with 
unsubstantiated cost estimates. It was merely a laundry list of projects. 
There was no indication of why these projects were thought to be 
necessary. It is no surprise that for two successive years, not one of 
the Markaz proposals was accepted by the District Council. The point 
to be appreciated is that the Punjab's IRDP was dependent upon the 
People's Works Programme for physical development and the latter 
proceeded under a different set of political and administrative priorities. 
In the Frontier Province, a Markaz was expending about Rs. 300,000 
annually, on the average, on civil works. About twenty civil works 
projects were underway on the average in a Markaz every year. These 
figures indicate a fair level of physical development activity. We are not 
in a position to judge the utility and endurability of these works. One 
should err on the side of caution in assessing the impact of civil works, 
given the infamous history of such efforts in general and the lessons of 
zMyrdal articulates this posit ion in these words: " . . . improved levels o f living 
a r e a precondit ion for higher labour input and efficiency and, generally, for changes 
in abilities and attitudes that are favourable to rising productivity." Gunnar 
Myrdal , Asian Drama, Vol . I ( N e w York : Pantheon, 1968), p. 57. 
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the Rural Works Programme in particular. There are some obvious dif-
ficulties which Prompt an observer to be skeptical about the worthiness of 
Markaz projects. One engineer was single-handedly supposed to design 
and supervise the construction of 20 d fferent schemes. Obviously 
Markaz projects would have been proceeding under severe technical and 
administrative constraints. 
In Battal, a sense of public largesse about funds budgeted for civil 
works could be detected. A large proportion of schemes consisted of 
terracing of fields—directly benefitting land owners. Of course, there 
were numerous road and water supply schemes under construction which 
may or may not bear community-wide benefits. At this point it must 
be said that the visible enthusiasm for civil works in Battal was directed 
at getting a scheme going and obtaining funds for it rather than on giving 
attention to the economic and social feasibility of such a proposal. A 
select group of small businessmen, retired officials, and semi urbanized 
farmers was at the forefront of proposing and executing civil works in 
local leaders' roles. 
There is a uniformity of approach between the Punjab and Frontier 
programmes <n the delivery of ' s o f t ' public services. Both assumed 
that posting of representatives of health, education or welfare departments 
at Markazes will, somehow, make respective public services available 
to area populations. The two provinces differed in the degree to which 
their programmes succeeded in obtaining the representatives posted at 
Markazes. The Frontier met with greater success though, as pointed 
out earlier the pattern of posting was similar in both provinces. 
Relatively new and expanding departments responded to lRDP's 
requirements to a greater degree than the entrenched and power-wield-
ing departments (Police, Revenue, Public Works, etc.). 
There are many limitations of deducing the effectiveness of the 
IRDP from successes or failures of postings. Many of these postings 
were auxiliary charges given to low-level functionaries, already present 
in the area. But this is a minor point in the context of other factors 
bearing on the issue of availability of public services. It is generally 
known that Public services are scarce in rural areas for want of resources, 
and are inaccessible because of the authoritarian outlook, lack of account-
ability, incompetence and corruption pervading public bureaucracies. 
These are well-known facts. By merely reshuffling some low-level, 
ill-equipped functionaries, the IRDP is not likely to increase significantly 
the supply of public services. A dispenser without medicines and an 
education officer without schools can be of little help to the local populace. 
These remain the limitations of the IRDP's approach. 
For this study, a measure of centrality was devised to obtain people's 
response to the availability of public services and commercial facilities 
at Markaz centres. Both Battal and Manawala field surveys revealed 
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the places where people had been going to obtain public services. Resi-
dents of surveyed villages continued to go to cities and towns, where they 
had been going before the IRDP, for health, education and other services 
This observation suggests that the postings have had little effect on the 
availability of these services from the residents' point of view. 
The conclusions of this section can be summed up by the observation 
that the mechanism adopted by the IRDP to increase the supply of public 
services were proving to be ineffective in Markazes studied for this evalua-
tion. The ineffectiveness can be attributed to simplistic assumptions 
of the programme, lack of resources and neglect of essential ground work 
in the form of local planning. There were secular trends towards 
* filtering down ' of public services and development of infrastructure 
which in turn were bringing about a change in the living conditions. 
The IRDP was, at best, an ancillary source of these changes. 
(d) People's Participation and Local Leadership 
To foster people's participation in the development of their area 
and to promote local leadership are avowed objectives of the IRDP. 
Since the dissolution of Basic Democracies, there are no elected local 
bodies in Pakistan. In the absence of representative local government 
institutions, the IRDP relies on ad-hoc local groups constituted as multi-
purpose co-operative societies. A two-tiered structure of co-operative 
societies, village and Markaz level, has been devised for Markaz areas. 
They are meant to serve as channels to communicate local needs and 
provide an institutional base for local action. The latter function is further 
reinforced through training of local leaders. 
In Pakistan, co-operative societies are generally considered to be 
ineffective, graft-ridden and cliquish organizations. They have very 
poor credibility among people. Thus the IRDP-sponsored co-operative 
societies begin with a reputational handicap. The results so far do not 
dispell this image. 
In Punjab, despite an initial success in getting co-operative societies 
established, the performance of these institutions has not been promising. 
In comparing the programme-sponsored societies with similar older 
institutions we found that the average paid-up and working capitals of 
two types of co-operative societies were not much different. In Manawala, 
there were no visible distinguishing features of Markaz co-operative 
societies. 
In Frontier, co-operative societies execute civil works with public 
funds. This is a unique role and it has generated considerable enthusiasm 
which is reflected in the sustained demand for forming new co-operative 
societies. 
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In Battal, Markaz officials had continued to be besieged by rival 
groups to be recognized as co-operative societies, even in the third year 
of the programme. Evidently the eligibility to get public funds had 
much to do with this popularity. The term co-operative society in 
Battal was synonymous with a construction enterprise. Our survey 
revealed that execution of civil works was the most commonly known 
function of co-operative societies in Battal. One striking revelation in 
Battal was that overwhelming proportion of the co-operative societies' 
leaders were local businessmen, semi-urbanized farmers or petty officials 
residing in ancestral villages. They are typically representatives of rural 
bourgeoisie. One of their prime assets is their familiarity with government 
procedures and felicity in cultivating acquaintance with public officials. 
These characteristics enhanced their acceptability as local leaders. It 
was this group which dominated Markaz co-operative societies. This 
pattern was detected, too late, to be formally investigated in Manawala. 
But in Battal, this could be documented with the data about the socio-
economic characteristics of the co-operative societies' office bearers. 
It can tentatively be concluded that the IRDP has attracted the same 
class of rural bourgeoisie sofad posh which normally appropriate any 
public development programme. In this case, the voluntary association 
with a co-operative group further reinforced cliquish tendencies. Co-
operative societies were ad hoc functional groups which could seldom 
be credited with local representativeness. Whatever little benefits the 
IRDP confers, most likely those are being appropriated by the middle 
and upper classes. 
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Objectives of the IRDP, Punjab 
(A) Short-Term 
(i) Formation of Farmer's co-operative Associations one in each village 
federating at the Markaz Farmer's Cooperative Association. 
(ii) Preparation of production plans which emphasise optimum crop 
combinations. 
(iii) Establishment of model farms one in each village and one at the 
Markaz level in order to demonstrate to the farmers the modern 
techniques of production. 
(iv) Supply of agricultural inputs such as seed, fertilizer, pesticides, farm 
implements, and also farm machinery, irrigation facilities. 
(v) Providing credit to the farmers on the basis of the suggested produc-
tion plans. 
(vi) Storage and marketing facilities that involve market committee and 
the farmer's co-operative associations at the village as well as at 
the Markaz level. 
(vii) Farmer's training programme emphasizing farm management 
techniques. 
(v/ii) Imparting social education and encouraging cultural self-relianc« 
activities for inculcating a spirit of self help. 
(B) Long-Term 
(i) Transformation of farmer's associations into production co-opera-
tive and finally to social co-operatives. 
(ii) Establishing training institutions for the farmers and the farms 
leaders to desseminate improved knowledge and skill among 
majority of the people in the rural areas. 
(iii) Establishing local or feeder markets at the Markaz for ensuring 
reasonable price to the farmers and paying the way for market 
oriented economy. 
(iv) Encouraging savings for increased farm investments. 
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(v) Introducing mixed farm enterprises such as poultry, milk produc-
tion sheep raising etc., to ensure increased incomes to the farmers. 
(vj) Planning and execution of the Peoples Works Programme for build-
ing necessary physical infrastructures. 
(vii) Preparing and executing of low cost housing schemes wherever 
nccessary. 
(viii) Encouraging cottage industry and agro-allied industries based 
on local raw material to off-set the problems of open and disguised 
un and underemployment in the rural areas. 
(ix) Developing agro-service sector at the Markaz so as to encourage 
socio-economic and commercial activity. 
(je) Establishing vertical and horizontal coordination from project to 
national level. Establishment of vertical and horizontal co-ordina-





Appendix Table B-3 
Performance of Co-operative Societies in Punjab 
S. 
N o . 
N a m e o f Markaz 
Organized Keg is-
Socie- tered 
tie* Soc ie -
ties 
( N o . ) ( N o . ) 
R a t i o Average A v e r a g e 
o f Share Share Working 
to Capital Capita l 
Working per per 
Capital Organized organized 
Society Society 
( N o . ) (Rs . ) (Rs . ) 
1. Chung 78 78 0 .45 760 1706 
2. Kanganpur . . 16 4 0 .17 478 2790 
3. Manawala . . 47 22 0 .42 717 1735 
4 . M o r e Khunda 11 11 0.31 2441 7976 
5. W h a n d o . . 61 61 0 .10 1381 14230 
6. Mansoorwal i 39 24 0 .24 916 7382 
7. Satrah 95 46 0 .60 856 1437 
8. Marakiwal .*.. 12 — — — — 
9. Daul ta la 72 60 0 .18 479 2674 
10. Chauntra 14 3 — — — 
11. Bahtar 39 32 — — — 
12. Ikhlas 23 15 0 .10 391 3783 
13. Dhudia l 43 4 0 0 .10 770 7738 
14. C h o a Saiden Shah 10 4 0 .06 274 4 8 3 0 
15. Jalalpur Jattan 44 44 0 .09 1173 12549 
16. M o n g 25 17 0 .97 888 920 
17. Bhagtanwala 53 53 0.11 2123 19183 
18. K o t M o m a n 18 7 0 .12 1161 13356 
19. Rajana 67 58 0 .54 2686 4966 
20. Thikriwala . . 24 15 0.11 2222 19547 
21 . Bhowana 64 46 0.13 1876 14082 
22. Garh Maharaja 21 12 0.11 2022 18425 
23. Kamar Mishani 26 15 0 .12 764 6289 
24. Kundian 10 7 0 .23 660 2850 
25. Lar 54 41 — 7966 1 — 
26. Katcha K h o o 11 7 — 1827 — 
27. Hujra 80 64 0 .37 1109 3056 
28. Harappa 21 4 0 .43 61 143 
29. Sher Sultan . . 24 24 0 .18 2320 13269 
30. Sanawan 5 4 0 .70 2520 3600 
31. Kot Chutta . . 33 22 0 .19 1190 6230 
32. U m a r K o t . . 5 4 2 .10 6460 3200 
33. N o o r p u r Naurang 63 53 0 .20 927 4718 
34. Dera Bakha 21 21 —r 825 — 
35. Dharanwala 72 67 0 .84 3417 4057 
36. Madrissa 3 1 — 1000 — 
37. Zahirpir 25 12 0 .43 2069 4769 
38. Al lahabad . . • 8 5 0 .34 2081 6106 
Source : Directorate o f the I R D P , (Punjab). 
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Appendix Table B-5 
Informant's Occupation 
S.No. Occupant Number Percentage 
1. Arhtis/shopkeepers, Big farmer . . 7 31.8 
owners 
2. Ex-Servicemen/Medium farmer . . 7 31.8 
owner/Teacher 
3. Small farmer owner/small entrepreneurs . . 3 13.7 
4. Non-Agricultural Labour . . 5 22.7 
Total: 22 100.0 
Source : The Vi l lage Survey. 
Appendix Table B-6 
Informant's Status 
S. No Role Number Percentage 
1. Influentials/Initiators 11 50 0 
2. Opinion Makers/Disseminators 7 31.8 
3. Followers 4 18.2 
Total: 22 100.0 
Source : T h e Vi l lage Survey. 
Note :— ( a ) InfluentiaN/Initiators include big land owners, Shopkeepers in near 
by Towns, Nambardars, Cx-B.D. Chairmen, Retired officials, School 
Teachers and elders o f predominant Baradari. 
(b) Opinion Makers /Disseminators , include Medium farmeis, Village 
Shopkeepers, Imam Masjid. 
(c) Fol lowers , include Small owner farmers, Tenants, Non-Agricultural 
makes and Kamis. 
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Appendix Table B-7 
Shift Towards Manawala 
(Yes) ( N o ) 
G o o d s and Services 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Banking 3 13.6 19 86.4 
Buying and Selling 4 18.2 18 81.8 
I R D P related Services . . 6 27.3 16 72.7 
Government Services I 4.5 21 95.5 
Source: T h e Vil lage Survey. 
Appendix Table B-8 
Information about Village Society Members 
Response Number Percentage 
No Member 8 36.4 
Could name a member but not his name . . 1 4.5 
Could name a member and his activities . . 7 31.8 
Don't Know/No Response 6 27.3 
Total : 22 100.0 
Source: T h e Vi l lage Survey. 
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Appendix Table B-9 




Almost Everybody . . . . . . 9 40.9 
Rich and Educated only . . . . 2 9.1 
Most of the farmers only . . . . 7 31.8 
Some Selected farmers only . . . . 4 18.2 
Total : 22 100.0 
Source : The Vi l lage Survey. 
Appendix Table B-10 
Needs of the Village 
S. N e e d s 
N o . 
1st Ment ion 
(Yes) 
2nd Ment ion 
(Yes) 
3rd Ment ion 
(Yes) 
N o . Per. N o . Per. N o . Per. 
1. Fertil izer/seed . . 1 4 .5 3 13.6 2 9.1 
2. Co-operat ive Society 1 4.5 4 18.3 — — 
3. Drinking Water 7 31.8 — — 4 18.3 
4. R o a d s 2 9.1 7 31.8 5 22.6 
5. School 7 31.8 4 18.3 6 27.3 
6. Dispensary/Hospi ta l — — 1 4.5 — — 
7. Irrigation V/ater — — — — 3 13.6 
8. Others 4 18.3 3 13.5 2 9.1 




Objectives of the IRDP in North West Frontier Province 
(/) To establish a Centre (Markaz) of development administration for 
a conveniently small area (a police station area in N W f P ) To 
construct here office building and a residential colony to accommo-
date all departmental representatives. To promote coordination 
between the departmental and local institutions like cooperatives 
and self government. 
(ii) To establish Local Government Council at union level and markaz 
level. To locate the markaz council at the centre and coordinate 
its work with the departments through a local government official 
(at present called Project Manager) and an elected Chairman of 
the council. 
(Hi) To plan and complete the physical infrastructure for the area, roads, 
drainage, irrigation, land improvement and electrification. 
(iv) To make organisation and mobilization of the village people as the 
chief concern of the centre To create for this purpose, the self 
government councils, and a two tier cooperative system (village 
primary cooperatives and markaz federation). 
(v) To train intensively and continuously many cadres of local leaders 
(councillors, cooperative managers, model farmers, project commit-
tees, teachers, etc.). 
(vi) To promote extension education and servicing by all nation building 
departments through village institutions, especially cooperatives. 
(vii) To create a strong and viable structure of cooperative credit for the 
majority of farmers (most of them small) in the shape of the two 
tier cooperative system, the primary villages societies and the marka? 
federation. To promote thrift, saving and investment, alongwith 
credit, to collect equity capital and aim at self-financing and self-
management. To coordinate the extension and servicing activities 
of the department with cooperatives. The federation's function 
will be to coordinate, train and supervise, alongwith banking. The 
village cooperatives, in most cases, will be entrusted with the execu-
tion of infrastructure works. 
(viii) To add gradually other blocks (e.g., machine workshop and tractor 
station, tube-well drilling and maintenance section, cooperative 
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processing unit, agro-industries). The emphasis will be on the 
growth and expansion of the cooperative sector, financed and con-
trolled by the majority of small farmers. 
(ix) As the villages become better organised and more productive, to 
expand the health and education programmes, e.g., establish a 
school board to organise alongwith the existing institutions, literacy, 
youth and women programmes. 
(x) Integration with Regional Planning and Agrovillcs. 
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Appendix Table C-l 
Works Expenditures in the N.W.F.P. 
s . 




1. Toru 288221 
2. Kulachi . . 444934 
3. Darbana 304850 
4. Ghazni Khel 203189 
5. Bilitang 365524 
6. Akora Khattak 674600 
7. Bari Kot 535008 
8. Mohri Bedban 344000 
9. Battal 366663 
10. Drosli 553051 
11. Khawaz Khela 230175 
12. Daudzai 834580 
13. Top . . 222156 
14. Dir . . 219233 
15. Doabe 279234 
Total : 5555818 
Average : 370,388 
Source : Directorate o f Rural Deve lopment , Peshawar. 
Appendix Table C-2 
Informant's Occupation 
Occupation Number Percentage 
Shopkeepers/Farmer owner/Professionals 11 55.0 
Small farmer owner . . . . 8 40.0 
Tenants . . . . . . 1 5.0 
Total : 20 100.0 
Source : T h e Vi l lage Survey . 
Appendix Table C-3 
Informant's Status 
Status Number Percentage 
Influentials/Initiator . . . . 7 35.0 
Disseminators/Opinion maker . . 9 45.0 
Follower . . . . . . 4 20.0 
Total: 20 100.0 
Source: The Village Survey. 
Note :— (a) Influential/Initiators include Big land owners, Shopkeepers in nearby 
towns, Ex-B.D. Chairman, Retired Officials, School Teachers etc. 
(b) Disseminators /Opinion makers include Medium farmers, vil lage 
shopkeepers, Imam Maijid. 
(c) Fol lowers include Small farmer owner, Tenants , Non-Agricultural 
labour and Kamis etc. 
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A p p e n d i x T a b l e C - 4 
Shift Towards Battal 
G o o d s and Services 
Yes N o 
N u m b e r Percentage Number Percentage 
Banking 0 0 .0 20 100.00 
Buying and Sell ing 1 5.0 19 95 .00 
I R D P related services 11 55.0 9 45 .00 
Government Services 1 5.0 19 95 .00 
Source : T h e Village Survey 
Appendix Table C-5 
Meetings of Village Societies 
Response Number Percentage 
Don't know . . . . . . . . 1 5.0 
Infrequently . . . . . . . • 1 5.0 
Regularly . . 15 75.0 
Not Applicable . . . . . . . . 3 15.0 
Total : 20 100.0 
Source : The Village Survey. 
89 
Appendix Table C-6 
Accomplishment of Co-operative Societies 
1st Mention 2nd Ment ion 3rd Ment ion 
(Yes) (Yes) (Yes) 
Accompl i shment 
N u m b e r Percen- N u m b e r Percen- N u m b e r Percent-
tage tage tage 
Drinking Water 1 5.0 — — — — 
Irrigation Water 3 15.0 2 10.0 1 5 .0 
R o a d s 8 40.0 — — — — 
Co-operat ive Society — — 1 5.0 — — 
Co-operat ive Loans — — — — — — 
F l o o d Contro l Bunds/Dams — — 3 15.0 1 5 .0 
N o R e s p o n s e / N o t h i n g 8 40.0 14 70.0 18 90.0 
Total.- 20 100.0 20 100.0 20 100.0 
Source: T h e Village Survey 
Appendix Table C-7 
Information about IRDP Officials 
Response Number Percentage 
Don't know 3 15.0 
Heard of them/know them 8 40.0 
Know and informed . . 9 45.0 
Total: 20 100.0 
Source : The Village Survey. 
9 0 
Appendix Table C-8 
Needs of Village 
s . 
N o 
N e e d s 
1st Ment ion 2nd Ment ion 3rd Ment ion 
Number Percen-
tage 
N u m b e r Percen-
tage 
N u m b e r Percen 
tage 
1. Co-operatives/others 2 10.0 3 15.0 5 25 .0 
2. Electricity 2 10.0 1 5.0 1 5 .0 
3. Irrigation Water 1 5.0 5 25.0 2 10.0 
4. Drinking Water 10 50.0 4 20.0 3 15.0 
5. R o a d 5 25 .0 3 15.0 2 10.0 
6. Street Paving — — 4 20.0 4 20.0 
7. Dispensary — — — — 2 10.0 
8. School — — — — 1 5.0 
Total : 20 100.0 20 100.0 20 100.0 
Source : T h e Village Survey. 
Appendix Table C-9 
Status of Society Office Bearers 
S.No. Status Number Percentage 
1. Influential/Initiator . . . . . . 34 45.9 
2. Disseminator/Opinion maker . . . . 24 32.5 
3. Follower 16 21.6 
Total: 74 100.0 
Source : The Village Survey.: 
Note :— (a) Influential/Initiators include Big land owners/Shopkeepers in nearby 
towaslNambardarslEx-B.D. Chairman/Retired officials/School teachers. 
(6) Disseminators/Opinion Makers/ include Medium farmers-Village S h o p -
keepers/ /mam Masjid/Ex-Patwari etc. 
(c) Fol lowers include Small farmer owners/Tenants/Non-Agricultural wor-





The methodology of this study is determined by the nature of the 
programme it purports to evaluate. The IRDP is an instrument of organiz-
ing local populations and co-ordinating public services. Its aims are broad 
i.e. seek income and welfare changes in the rural sector. Yet the measures 
undertaken by the programme are only vaguely related to these broader 
goals. 
The operational objectives have not been clearly spelled out. Even 
a consistent statement of objectives was not to be found. The methodolgy 
had to be designed within these parameters. 
At the outset, it became obvious that the evaluation was going to be 
a study in the 'efficacy' of the programme and not its 'efficiency'. The 
former being a goal achievement test and the latter being the conventional 
economic analysis i.e. cost/benefit (Freeman 1970 : 81). This decision 
was necessary because the programme does not have well defined material 
inputs and correlated outputs whose values might be used as indices of costs 
and benefits. To clarify the nature of goals and to derive a set of instru-
mental objectives for evaluation, various statements of the programme were 
analyzed and seven instinct elements identified to serve as the analytical 
guided data collection and assessments. Findings were logically analyzed 
to determine whether the programme was helping to realize broad income 
and welfare objectives. This is not an uncommon procedure for the evalua-
tion of such programmes. 
Another methodological issue was whether to set up control areas 
matched with Markazes to be studied and then by comparison to derive 
conclusions about effects produced by the programme. It is a text book 
procedure for evaluation, though it is seldom applied in social research. 
Anyway, our decision to opt out of this procedure was guided by some 
logical reasons. The difficulties of matching control and experimental 
areas are well known. It is also obvious that time series data of signi-
ficant social indicators must exist to obtain desired results for such a 
procedure. It is almost an exception where one finds such preconditions 
fulfilled. Even in countries like U.S.A. and Canada very few programmes 
are being evaluated under such experimental procedures. Apart from these 
limitations there is a question about the nature of the programme being 
evaluated. 
The IRDP is not a programme with substantial material inputs which 
must have produced noticeable effects on Social outputs. If one was testing 
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the effect of new seed or fertilizer, one is dealing with a situation where a 
well defined input is related with a measurable output. In such conditions, 
an experimental design is a valid procedure. But in a programme aiming 
to promote people's participation, or integration of public services or en-
hance centrality of a town, input-output relations are not precise enough 
to allow an experimental design. These are organizational norms whose 
realization is assumed to be beneficial in contemporary developmental ideo-
logy. Thus, the evaluation of the IRDP is essentially a task of assessing 
the realization of a set of norms. It has to be a linear, ex-post facts pro-
cedure. Our point is that the nature of the programme is such that it could 
not have admitted an experimental design. 
Field Procedures 
Two Markazes chosen for the in-depth study were meant to be the 
representative of the programme efforts. The choice was based on two 
criteria (i) a Markaz should have been in operation for 2-3 years to allow 
the programme to lake hold (ii) a Markaz should not be a pilot project 
which receives greater attention and resources. Battal in the N.W.F.P. 
and Manawala in Punjab were among few Markazes in respective provinces 
meeting these criteria. The choice was, obviously, purposive as well as 
representative. 
Within each Markaz four villages were selected for field surveys. In 
each case the selected villages had been included in an earlier base line sur 
vey. Among those selected were villages of varying accessability and social 
mix. Taking into consideration, the specific programme elements of each 
province, two interview schedules were prepared (and pretested) to obtain 
data about the feelings and experiences of various caste/class groups in 
sampled villages. It must be noted that our focus was on group rather 
than individual reactions. How Zamindars or Kamis or Sheikhs as a group 
felt and thought about the Markaz? and what they felt to be its benefits 
or disutilities for them. These questions were sought to be answered for a 
group in each village through an informant. 
To choose an informant, the social structure of a village (i.e. caste/ 
class mix) was initially outlined and care was taken to include representa-
tives of all significant groups. At this point, it must be emphasized that 
this is a methodological departure from interviewing procedures commonly 
outlined in text bocks. Social Scientists trained in western liberal tradition 
tend to base their data on opinions of a-id experiences of individuals 
obtained behind the veil of seclusion and secrecy. This procedure is 
valid only for social structures characterized by high degree of individuali-
zation and atomization. In Pakistan, particularly in its rural areas, an 
individual is almost inseparable from his kin/class group. In villages, it is 
rare to find an individual interviewee coming forward alone for an 
interview. Most of village social surveys are done in group settings, yet 
the pretense of having obtained individual responses is mainiained 
without questioning the basis of such a requirement. Freire has indicated 
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that learning and thinking is a group experience in the third world coun-
tries [Freire 1970], To accept that group is the basic unit of opinions and 
experiences for public affairs and to design research instruments on this 
basis is a more realistic approach for rural studies in Pakistan. This study 
made the choice consciously. It preceded to tap collective opinions by 
asking respondents to articulate feelings and experiences of their reference 
groups (Kin, Baradari) and, wherever feasible, by encouraging some group 
discussions before identifying the consusual response. In one sense, it 
has made explicit the group influence which normally remains submerged 
in social science practice in rural Pakistan. 
Overall, there is a bias in this study towards respondents and groups 
associated with the IRDP. This bias should favour the IRDP. As the 
evaluation reveals that the programme have had a very modest degree of 
effectiveness, it must thus be read that the programme might have been 
less effective than what has been concluded, because of the favourables 
bias in the selection of respondents. Certainly the programme could not 
have been more effective than what the study suggests. 
Notes: 
Freeman, Howard. (1970) Social Research and Social Policy. New 
Jersey, Prentice Hall. 
Freire, Paulo. (1970) Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York, 
The Seabury Press. 
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